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This work was conducted in an effort to better understand the role that 
activational mechanisms in memory play in the etiology and maintenanc of anxiety 
disorders.  The affect of word stimuli characteristics, such as affective valence and 
semantic association with worry, on the association between inhibition and trait worry 
was investigated under different types of induced thought.  Previous research has 
demonstrated that worry is associated with negative affect, and that worry may be 
semantically organized in memory.  Based on these findings, it was hypothesized that 
words would be differentially inhibited in association with trait worry when worry was 
induced compared to neutral thought.  Stimuli characteristics including the positive or 
negative affective valence of words, and their semantic association w th common 
domains of worry were expected to moderate the relationship between inhibition and trait 
worry.  In order to investigate these hypotheses, 86 undergraduate st d nts from the 
University of Texas at Austin completed a series of memory tasks designed to measure 
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inhibition for either negative or positive words, both associated and unassociated with 
worry.  They underwent either idiopathic worry or neutral thought induction prior to 
completing each memory task, and completed questionnaires assessing trait worry and 
thought suppression.  The findings provide partial support for the hypotheses.  Higher 
levels of trait worry were associated with less inhibition of negative words, but more 
inhibition of positive words semantically associated with worry.  Contrary to predictions, 
differential induction of worry did not affect the relationship between inhibition and trait 
worry.  The research and clinical implications of these findings are discussed. 
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This introduction is designed to provide a literature review relevant to the study in 
three main areas including the processing of emotion in memory, the na ure and functions 
of worry, and inhibition as a process in memory.  Following the review, literatur  specific 
to developing the rationale for the study is integrated from these different areas.  Upon 
establishing the rationale, an overview of the study is presented along with the 
hypotheses tested. 
Emotional Processing in Memory 
Emotional processing occurs across a broad spectrum of emotions.  For the 
purpose of this investigation, the term emotional processing is used to specifically 
reference the processing of fear.  The following sections on emotional processing provide 
a general background on network models of memory, a general theory of emotion and 
memory, and two theories of emotional processing, the latter of which posits a memory 
activation and elaboration framework for emotional processing. 
Memory as a Framework for Emotion 
NETWORK MODELS OF MEMORY : A BRIEF OVERVIEW  
Information in memory is commonly represented in a network structure.  
Propositional networks provide one way to conceptualize how information is represented 
and structured in memory.  In this model, a proposition serves as the smallest stand-alone 
unit of knowledge about which judgments or evaluations are made.  Propositions erve as 
the building blocks of the network, and a set of propositions, each consisting of a set of 
relations and arguments, makes up a node (Anderson, 1995).  A node is a larger 
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information structure reflecting ideas or concepts that consist of a set of propositions.  
Concepts or ideas (nodes) in a propositional network are interconnected or associated by 
links to shared propositions.  For example, the concepts of “airplane” and “bird” would 
be linked in association by the propositional elements “wing” or “flight,” which they hold 
in common (Anderson, 1995).  In addition, all of the propositions within a concept ar  
associated with one another through their common associative link to the same concept.   
Similar to propositional networks, semantic networks provide a structure for 
representing conceptual knowledge in memory (Quillian, 1966).  Conceptual knowledge 
represents an abstraction of experiences to categories based on properties associated with 
those experiences (Anderson, 1995).  Analogous to concepts and propositions in a 
propositional network, a category serves as a node that is comprised of associated 
properties.  Similarly, categories with shared properties are link d to one another within 
the semantic network; also, all of the properties within a category are associated.  This 
provides an important foundational basis for a number of characteristics in semantic 
networks regarding associations between properties and categories.  One such 
characteristic is that the more frequently a property is encou tered within the context of a 
category, the more strongly that property becomes associated with the category.  This 
implies that experience alters the association strengths between categories and their 
properties.  In addition, a higher frequency of accessing categories and/or their associated 
properties in memory results in a higher level of activation and lower activation threshold 
for these categories and properties (Loftus, 1974; Anderson, 1976).  
Another important characteristic is that activation can spread from one category to 
another through the activation of shared properties (Collins & Loftus, 1975).  For 
instance, consider the category “friends,” and the subsequent activation of the category 
“family”.  The category “friends” includes a number of items (i.e. closeness, support, & 
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loyalty) that are properties of the category “family.”  Henc , activation of the category 
“friends” leads to activation of all properties in the category including closeness, support, 
and loyalty.  Due to their simultaneous existence as properties within the category 
“family” these properties subsequently lead to increased activation of the category 
“family”.  This process, through which the activation of one category increases the 
activation of another category, is known as spreading activation (Collins & Loftus, 1975).  
In a semantic network, both activation frequency and spreading activation play an 
important role in developing and modifying associations between categories and their 
associated properties.  Levels of activation govern the likelihood that a particular memory 
will be accessed as well as how quickly it will be accessed (Loftus, 1974).  Both the 
recency and frequency with which a memory has been accessed determin  its level of 
activation (Anderson, 1976).  The more recently or frequently a memory has been 
accessed, the more active the memory is, and vice versa.  Another proc ss that may play 
an important role in governing the level of activation in memory is inhibition, or the 
suppression of activation.  This will be discussed in detail later. 
EMOTION AND MEMORY   
In the semantic network theory of mood and memory, Bower (1981; 1987) 
proposed that moods are embedded within the associative memory network as “special-
purpose units (or nodes).” that contain sets of concepts, actions, and events.  It is 
theorized that each primary emotion (i.e. sad, happy, angry, afraid, etc.) exists as a node 
within the semantic network.  This theory provides a cognitive framework, based on 
memory, through which emotions are activated, modified, and appraised, and through 
which emotional states can be re-experienced based on recall of past emotional events.  
Under this theory, an emotion node is characterized by its inputs and outputs within the 
network, each containing a set of corresponding propositions (Bower, 1987).  Input 
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propositions would include the set of environmental stimuli that cue the motion, as well 
as judgments about the nature of the stimuli that would serve to modify its activation.  
Output propositions would consist of various responses associated with the emotion such 
as appraisal about the subjective importance of the emotion, behavioral and somatic 
responses, and labeling or classifying of the emotional experience.  An important 
consequence of such a conceptualization is that it provides for a fluid system in which an 
emotion in memory may constantly undergo modification based on reciprocal influences 
exchanged between input and output propositions (Bower, 1987).   
Consistent with the characteristics of semantic networks previously de cribed, the 
frequency and recency of retrieving an emotional memory would result in a higher 
activation level of the emotion in memory, thus reducing its threshold for later activation.  
Further, spreading activation resulting from cueing a proposition associ ted with a 
particular emotion would increase the activation level of all of the other propositions 
associated with the emotion.  Hence, cued input provided by activating the memory of an 
emotional experience would also activate the output propositions associated with the 
emotion, resulting in the initiation of emotional expressions and responses (Bower, 
1987).  For example, mentally picturing a time when someone fell out of a tree might 
result in activating the associated emotion of fear (not necessarily to the same degree) 
experienced during the initial event.  In turn, the activation of fear would result in 
increased autonomic arousal and possibly cognitive re-appraisals reinforcing personal 
meaning to the nature of trees (i.e. height) or climbing, particularly that they are 
dangerous, represent threat, and should be avoided.  Moreover, spreading activation 
would not be isolated to propositions about the specific event of falling from a tree.  The 
activation level for all propositions associated with fear would increase, thus resulting in 
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a greater likelihood that other fearful events, such as almost getting hit by a car, would be 
recalled (Bower, 1987). 
In addition to the theoretical implications involving spreading activation of 
emotion, Bower’s theory also addresses how certain emotions and certain propositions 
for a specific emotion can be selectively activated.  While a full review of this is beyond 
the scope of the current review, one aspect of this deserves comment.  A mechanism that 
allows for the selective activation of certain propositions associated with an emotion 
would enable cognitive appraisal of an emotion in the absence of the subjctive 
emotional experience and emotional responding.  As will be dealt with later, inhibitory 
processes may play a role in governing selective activation in semantic networks in 
general, and through such networks the selective activation of different processes 
involved in emotion.  Particularly, those related to the processing of fear. 
In Bower’s commentary (1987), he presents a number of predictions from this 
theory.  First, that retrieval of information should be enhanced if the mood state during 
encoding is congruent with the mood state during retrieval.  Second, perception and 
attention should favor mood congruent stimuli, resulting in mood congruent biases in 
perception and attention.  In evaluating evidence related to these pr dictions, he presents 
a review of literature indicating that neither effect has been consistently identified in 
relation to induced mood state.  More consistent, though equivocal mood congruent 
memory effects have been identified in association with longer standing or more chronic 
mood conditions including high levels of anxiety and depression (Gotlib & McCann, 
1984; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986; Foa & McNally, 
1986; Bower, 1987; Broadbent & Broadbent, 1988; MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; 
Matthews, Richards, & Eysenck, 1989; Mathews, 1990; Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards, 
& Mathews, 1991; Mogg, Mathews, & Eysenck, 1992; Richards & French, 1992; Russo, 
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Fox, Bellinger, & Nguyen-Van-Tam, 2001).  Further, studies support the proposition that 
emotional information is semantically organized (Altarriba & Bauer, 2004) and have 
demonstrated an additive effect of physiological arousal and semantic relatedness in 
enhancing recall of emotional words (Buchanan, Etzel, Adolphs, & Tranel, 2006).  Mood 
states have also been shown to affect regions in the brain associated with semantic 
activity during the encoding of emotional words (Kiefer, Schuch, Scen k, & Fiedler, 
2007). 
As an explanation for the different pattern of results seen between induced and 
longer standing mood states, Bower (1987) offers a frequency of activation hypothesis.  
When the emotional state is long standing, mood related propositions are purportedly 
accessed and elaborated on more frequently.  Thus, maintaining a higher level of overall 
activation for these propositions and consequent mood state.  In contrast, an induced 
mood state is transient, and does not result in this repeated and frequent activation of 
information associated with the emotion.  Consequently, it would not result in a higher 
activation level of emotion-based propositions and mood state.  This explanation is 
consistent with findings discussed earlier that the increased retrieval frequency of 
information, within the framework of a semantic network model of memory, results in a 
higher level of activation for that information in memory, and a lower threshold for later 
activation of that information (Loftus, 1974; Anderson, 1976).  
A particular problem for this theory is a relative paucity of findings that 
preferential recall of information is related to either current or long-standing emotional 
states, primarily anxiety states (Bower, 1987; Mogg, Mathews, & Weineman, 1987; 
1989; Mathews, 1990; Mathews & Macleod, 1994, Mathews & Milroy, 1994a).  One 
explanation of this posits that the recall biases that have been detected for anxiety are the 
result of a response rather than memory bias (Dowens & Calvo, 2003).  In support of this, 
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Dowens and Calvo (2003) report findings in which no differences were found between 
high and low trait anxious participants on a surprise recall test of threat words lexically 
but not semantically processed after controlling for recall intrusions and recall sensitivity.  
They cite these findings as support for the proposition that a retrieval-based memory bias 
is not present for anxiety.  Another possibility that will be explored in greater detail later 
is that failures to identify such effects in memory may result from methodologies 
requiring recognition or free-recall as outcome measures.  Paradigms that yield measures 
of activational processes in memory, which are posited to underlie memory biases, may 
provide a more potent alternative strategy to overcome previous failed efforts to identify 
memory biases related to anxiety states.  
EMOTIONAL PROCESSING OF FEAR 
In an effort to provide a parsimonious framework to explain the relativ y 
equivalent success of various fear reduction procedures, Rachman (1980) provides a 
working-definition of emotional processing.  He states that emotional processing should 
be, “regarded as a process whereby emotional disturbances are abso bed, and decline to 
the extent that other experiences and behaviour can proceed without disruption.”  
Furthermore, Rachman (1980) proposes that when emotional processing does not ccur, 
intrusive signs of emotional disturbance will either persist or reccur.  Thus, failed 
emotional processing offers a potential explanation for the maintenanc  of fear, treatment 
non-response, and return of fear.  As an example, consider an individuals initi l exposure 
to a phobic stimulus such as a bee.  While in the park, an individual encounters a bee for 
the first time and is stung.  According to Rachman’s (1980) definition, the emotional 
disturbance experienced as a result of getting stung should decline when successful 
emotional processing of the event takes place.  In essence, the event was disturbing, but 
should not remain disturbing.  To the extent emotional disturbance does not decline, it 
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may interfere with and disrupt other behaviors.  In the case of bing stung by a bee, this 
may be expressed in many ways, such as wearing heavy clothes outside during the heat 
for perceived protection against a potential bee encounter, or in more extrem  cases, not 
going outside at all for fear of being stung again.  According to Rachman (1980), this 
disruption of normal behavior arising from the initial event occurs because emotional 
processing for the event was not successful, and it will continue until successful 
emotional processing takes place. 
The identification of emotional processing as playing an integral role in recovery 
from emotional disturbance partly derives from earlier research investigating the efficacy 
of imaginal exposure techniques in reducing fear (Rachman, 1980).  Lang (1977) 
observed that lower levels of fear reduction using imaginal exposure during systematic 
desensitization was related to reduced heart rate reactivity during the exposure session.  
Consequently, it became important to ensure sufficient fear activation during therapeutic 
exposures by assessing indices of physiological arousal such as heart rate.  In essence, 
successful fear reduction using exposure exercises requires sufficient fear activation, 
indexed by heart rate reactivity, which may not consistently result with mental imagery 
techniques. 
In his exploration of factors likely to facilitate emotional processing, Rachman 
(1980) makes a connection between relaxation and an increased vividness of phobic 
imagery that later proves important for exploring the role of w rry in emotional 
processing.  In particular, he cites observations by Borkovec (1979) that relaxation 
training enhances the latency of sleep onset and reduces the occurren e of intrusive 
thoughts that interfere with sleep onset.  This lays the groundwork for the possibility that 
different kinds of thought activity may (i.e. imaginal or verbal thought) interact with 
and/or influence one another with respect to the activation of fear.   
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Even given the large contribution of this theory, one significant limitation of 
Rachman’s (1980) conceptualization of emotional processing is that it does not propose a 
mechanism that underlies emotional processing.  That is, what process r processes 
provide the basis upon which fear is sufficiently activated to enabl emotional 
processing? 
In a theory exploring mechanisms that control emotional processing (Foa and 
Kozak, 1986; Rauch & Foa, 2006), it has been proposed that emotional processing occurs 
when information structures in memory, representing emotions, are modified.  Thus 
emotional processing, considered the mechanism through which habituation to a feared 
stimulus occurs, functions through memory processes.  It is argued that reduction of 
pathological fear requires sufficient activation of the fear structure in memory, and the 
incorporation of evidence contrary to at least some of the pathologica  elements of the 
fear structure.  From a semantic network conceptualization, activation of the fear 
structure would require sufficient activation of its associated propositional elements in 
memory.  In addition, modification of the fear structure would occur when disconfirming 
evidence (new propositions) has been incorporated into a new memory associated with 
the fear stimulus that no longer results in activation of the fear structure when cued by the 
stimulus.  In essence, new conceptual knowledge of the stimulus is gained through 
experience, and new meaning associations about the threatening nature of the stimulus 
are developed and incorporated into memory-based representations of thestimulus.  
Holding to the view that fear structures in memory are semantic i  nature, what 
distinguishes normal and pathological fears are their differential resistance to fear 
structure modifications (Foa and Kozak, 1986; Rauch & Foa, 2006). Normal fears are not 
resistant to fear structure modification, but pathological fears are.   
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This theory of emotional processing suggests that any cognitive process or 
behavior that limits the successful activation of the fear structu e in memory, or the 
incorporation of new, inconsistent information, would consequently interfere with or 
prevent emotional processing.  For example, variables such as distraction may influence 
emotional processing by reducing the degree to which fear structures are successfully 
activated, or hinder the processing of information incompatible with the fear structure 
(Foa & Kozak, 1986).  Support for this has been provided by studies investigating the 
effect of attentional disruption on habituation of fear.  Findings from these studies 
indicate that attentional disruption is sufficient to negatively influence emotional 
processing (Grayson, Foa, & Steketee, 1982; Sartory, Rachman, & Grey, 1982;
Kamphuis & Telch, 2000; Telch, et al. 2004; Johnstone & Page, 2004; Dvorak-Be tsch, 
Curtin, Rubinstein, & Newman, 2007).  According to emotional processing theory (F a 
& Kozak, 1986; Rauch & Foa, 2006), when attention is disrupted or directed away from 
the threat, fear reduction is hampered by interference of attention with the incorporation 
of threat disconfirming evidence into memory.   
The Nature and Functions of Worry 
WORRY: THE EMERGENCE OF A CONSTRUCT 
The emergence of worry as an important construct in the study of anxiety began 
in the late 1970s with the identification of intrusive cognitive activity (worry) at bedtime 
in individuals with insomnia (Borkovec, 1979), and the finding that worry rathe  than 
physiological arousal predicted poorer academic test performance i  students 
(Deffenbacher, 1978; Deffenbacher, 1980; Deffenbacher & Hazelus, 1985).  Coinciding 
with an evolving conceptual understanding of worry and the role it plays in anxiety 
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disorders, the diagnostic criteria for generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) underwent 
considerable transformation.   
A universal diagnostic feature among anxiety disorders is the presenc  of 
persistent and excessive anxiety.  In the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, third edition (DSM-III; American Psychiatric Association, 1980), GAD served 
as a residual diagnostic category when persistent and significant anxiety was present and 
could not be better accounted for by another anxiety or mood disorder.  As esearch 
efforts continued to increase understanding of the nature and functions of worry, worry 
was identified as playing a central role in GAD.  Consequently, changes in DSM-III-R 
(APA, 1987) resulted in excessive and/or unrealistic worry as the central diagnostic 
feature of GAD, as long as the worry was identified in two or me life spheres and 
unrelated to another Axis I disorder. 
In accordance with DSM-IV (APA, 1994), GAD is currently diagnosed when 
worry is excessive and uncontrollable, occurs across multiple life spheres (e.g., 
relationships, finances, health, work performance, etc.), lasts for a pe iod of at least six 
months, is accompanied by at least three additional symptoms, and results in significant 
impairment or distress.  Given these criteria, pathological worry ma  be differentiated 
from normal worry based on its frequency, controllability, and chronicity.  In essence, 
normal worry becomes pathological when it becomes excessive, uncontrollable, and 
chronic.   
The identification of worry as excessive is closely tied to determining whether the 
presence and amount of worry are realistic given the “objective” realities of an 
individual’s circumstances.  For example, constant worry about job loss w uld be 
considered excessive in an individual with a history of good performance evaluations, 
who has repeatedly been promoted, and has not recently received negative performance 
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feedback.  In contrast, this same worry would not be considered excessive in an 
individual with a history of negative performance evaluations, and who has received 
repeated warnings in which potential job loss is a possible consequenc for failure to 
improve performance. 
The uncontrollability of worry is assessed by self-report and generally reflects an 
individual’s self-perceived control over worry.  While the chronicity of worry may be 
considered in a variety of ways, it is diagnostically determined based on the duration over 
which pervasive and unremitting worry has occurred.  For instance, worry may be 
pervasive and unremitting if it continues in the face of evidence disconf rming the need 
for it, or worry may also be viewed as pervasive and unremitting f it occurs over a long 
period of time.  The current diagnostic criteria employs the latt r by requiring that worry 
occur more often than not over at least a six-month period. 
In an exploration of the value of worry as a concept, Borkovec (1985) suggested 
that the manner by which cognitive patterns among anxiety disorders can be modified 
presents a “real challenge” to both basic and applied research.  To meet these challenges, 
Borkovec (1985) suggested the initiation of research focused on clarifying the nature and 
functions of cognitive processes that underlie anxiety.  To this end, a growing body of 
research has emerged with the primary goal of developing an understanding of the nature 
and functions of worry.   
DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN WORRY AND ANXIETY  
Identifying worry as a construct independent of anxiety has proven to be a 
challenging task.  Until recently, the terms anxiety and worry have often been used 
interchangeably.  This is not surprising given the high prevalence of worry among 
anxiety disorders (Barlow, 1988) and the difficulty of conceptually distinguishing the two 
(O’Neill, 1985; Borkovec, 1985; Mathews, 1990).  Despite the challenges, a number of 
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studies have investigated whether worry and anxiety are indeed independent constructs 
(Zebb & Beck, 1998).  One approach to investigating construct independence is the use 
of correlation strategies employed to ascertain the strength of association between 
measures of anxiety and worry, and to demonstrate their unique predictive value on other 
behavioral measures.  Employing such strategies, a number of studies hav  yielded 
evidence supporting the independence of these two constructs (Zebb & Beck, 1998; 
Verkuila, Brosschota, & Thayerb, 2007).  For example, trait worry and trit anxiety have 
been found to account for unique variance in both problem-solving and coping style 
among college students (Davey, Hamptom, Farrell, & Davidson, 1992; Davey, 1993; 
Belzer, D’Zurilla, Maydeu-Olivares, 2002), and the correlation betwen worry and trait 
anxiety in GAD patients is lower than in normal populations (Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & 
Borkovec, 1990).  In addition, intolerance of uncertainty is highly associated with worry 
independent of anxiety and depression levels (Dugas, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 1997). 
Despite emerging evidence suggesting that worry and anxiety ar  independent 
constructs, the anxiety literature does not consistently reflect th  independence of these 
constructs.  It is not uncommon to find the terms “worry” and “anxiety used 
interchangeably, as if they were synonymous.  This lack of distinction in the face of 
contrary evidence may underlie more recent efforts designed to clearly delineate the 
boundaries of the worry construct in order to provide a meaningful and theoretically valid 
definition independent of the anxiety construct.  One product of such efforts is the 
proposition that anxiety and worry may each serve as component parts of  larger anxiety 
construct.  In this context, the label “anxiety” has been used to refer to somatic activity 
associated with potential threat, whereas “worry” has been associ ted with the 
engagement of cognitive processes in response to potential threat.  The problem with this 
approach is that it ascribes to worry cognitive processes, such as the appraisal of present 
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threat, which may be more appropriately considered a component of anxiety than worry.  
As such, a definition of worry derived from empirical investigations into its nature and 
functions provides a conceptualization of worry that is not restricted or biased by 
attempts to define worry solely based on its distinction from anxiety. 
CONCEPTUALIZING WORRY 
Our understanding of worry has grown in richness and specificity.  Shortly after 
its emergence as a construct meriting clinical and scientific attention, Borkovec, 
Robinson, Pruzinsky, and DePree (1983) offered the first detailed definition of worry.   
Worry is a chain of thoughts and images, negatively affect laden and relatively 
uncontrollable.  The worry process represents an attempt to engage in mental 
problem solving on an issue whose outcome is uncertain but contains the 
possibility of one or more negative outcomes.  Consequently, worry relates 
closely to fear process. 
Since this definition was offered, significant research efforts have been dedicated 
to developing a more detailed and thorough understanding of both the nature and 
functions of worry.  The results of these efforts have provided support for much of this 
definition, revisions where the evidence merits them, and an increased und rstanding of 
the contribution of individual differences to the process of worry.  While evaluating the 
nature and functions of worry, it is important to consider that the concept of worry is 
commonly viewed as a pathological process.  To the contrary, worry may be considered 
an adaptive process that serves important functions related to problem solving and 
cognitive appraisal.  In this view, it is not pathological, but may become pathological 
through dysfunction or deregulation of mechanisms that control worry, r through 
processes that interfere with worry successfully achieving one of the functions it serves. 
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Problem Solving and Intolerance of Uncertainty 
Whether problem solving is a feature of worry, an epiphenomenon of worryor a 
process independent of worry has yet to be clearly determined.  As iscussed previously, 
worry has been found to be associated with problem solving (Davey et al., 1992; Davey, 
1993; Beltzer et al., 2002).  However, the association between worry and problem solving
doesn’t establish worry as representing, in part or whole, an attempt at problem solving.  
Two studies examining the perceived functions of worry by employing self-report 
assessments of the reasons for worrying have provided stronger evidence that worry does, 
in part, include problem solving (Freeston, Rheaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 
1994; Borkovec & Roemer, 1995).  Both of these studies found that one of the reasons 
reported for worrying was the identification of problem solutions.  However, the findings 
also indicate that problem solving is not the only perceived function of worry.  
Individuals also reported worrying as a way to prepare for or minimize the effects of 
negative events.  In addition, distraction from more distressing things was another reason 
cited for worrying.  The strongest evidence suggesting that worry involves problem 
solving comes from a study by Szabo & Lovibond (2002).  In an assessment of naturally 
occurring worry content, they examined self-monitoring diaries of w rry episodes 
containing entries over a seven-day period and found that 48% of worry content was 
related to problem solving.  While the preponderance of evidence suggests that worry 
does involve but is not limited to problem solving, some challenges remain in 
establishing the effects of worry on the efficacy of problem solving.   
In an article exploring the cognitive functions of anxiety and worry, Mathews 
(1990) highlights the difficulties of defining worry as a problem-solving process by 
stating, “Worry thus resembles problem-solving in some respects; but instead of leading 
to a satisfactory outcome, it is as if the danger is constantly being rehearsed without a 
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solution ever being found.”  Given the previously reported findings, it could be 
reasonably hypothesized that worry would aid problem solving.  However, to date the 
evidence seems to suggest that worry enhances some aspects of problem s lving while at 
the same time interfering with others.  Davey (1993) found that while c ronic worriers 
reported lower confidence in their social problem-solving abilities han non-worriers, 
they do not report differences in their social problem-solving skills.  Consequently, 
Davey suggests that worry may not influence the generation of solutions during problem 
solving, but rather it may be related to a reduced implementation of those solutions.  This 
explanation would be consistent with Mathews (1990) observation that worry d es not 
necessarily result in the resolution of a problem.  Further, evidence of a disconnection 
between the generation of solutions and their implementation was found in a study of the 
self-reported consequences of worry (Davey, Tallis, & Capuzzo, 1996).  The findings 
from this study indicate paradoxical consequences of worry related to problem solving.  
Worry was reported to both enhance analytical thinking about a problem and 
simultaneously exaggerate the problem.  One explanation for the lack of solution 
implementation by worriers may be their lack of confidence in their ability to solve 
problems.  Somewhat in contrast, Szabo and Lovibond (2006) report findings indicati g 
that solution generation may actually serve as a strategy to end worry.  However, this 
study did not address the role of pathological levels of worry, which by definition are 
excessive and uncontrollable.   
The lack of confidence that worriers have in their problem solving ability and 
their failure to implement solutions to a problem may be tied to their intolerance of 
uncertainty.  Tallis, Eysenck, and Mathews (1991) compared the response rate  of high 
and low worriers on a letter-search task when a visual target was absent and assessed the 
correlation between retarded response latencies and a measure of worry frequency.  
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Retarded response latency on the letter-search task in the absence of a visual t rget served 
as an index of intolerance of uncertainty as it reflects the applic tion of increased 
evidence requirements in performing the task.  Consistent with increased evidence 
requirements, the findings showed that high worriers took longer to respond when the 
visual target was not present.  Furthermore, a positive association between retarded 
response latencies and a measure of worry frequency was identified.  These findings 
indicate that high worriers may require elevated levels of evidence prior to reaching a 
decision, and that elevated levels of evidence requirement are associ ted with an 
increased frequency of worry.  As such, the inability to reach decisions, contingent upon 
increased evidence requirements, may serve as a maintaining factor for worry. 
In an application of emerging evidence that intolerance of uncertainty plays a role 
in maintaining worry, Dugas et al. (1997) investigated the relationship between 
intolerance of uncertainty, problem orientation, and trait worry.  In contrast to problem 
solving skills, which include defining a problem, generating alternaive solutions, making 
decisions, and implementing solutions, orientation is characterized as a general response 
set when faced with a problem.  A negative problem orientation is chara terized by 
heightened threat perception related to problems, low confidence in problem solving 
ability, and a tendency to negatively predict problem outcomes (D’Zurilla & Goldfried, 
1971; Robichaud & Dugas, 2005).  The findings of Dugas and et al. (1997) indicate that 
whereas problem-solving skills are not associated with worry both intolerance of 
uncertainty and negative problem orientation are.  Further, while intolerance of 
uncertainty and negative problem orientation share a considerable amount of variance in 
predicting worry, they also contribute unique variance to the prediction.   
Measures of problem orientation and intolerance of uncertainty have also been 
shown to differentiate between individuals with GAD and moderate non-clinical worriers 
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(Ladouceur, Blais, Freeston, & Dugas, 1998).  A model for GAD including intolerance of 
uncertainty, poor problem orientation, beliefs about worry, and cognitive avoidance was 
found to correctly distinguish with (82% correctly identified) betw en individuals with 
and without GAD (Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 1998).  Evidence for th  role 
of intolerance of uncertainty in worry and GAD has not been limited to studies 
employing correlation strategies.  In a study manipulating intolerance of uncertain with a 
gambling procedure designed to induce or reduce intolerance of uncertai ty, participants 
in the increased uncertainty condition demonstrated a higher level of worry than 
participants in the decreased uncertainty condition (Ladouceur, Gosselin, & Dugas, 
2000).  This finding is important because it highlights the potential causal effect of 
intolerance of uncertainty on worry.  Individuals with a high intolerance of uncertainty 
have also been shown to demonstrate a recall bias for threat information and report a 
higher degree of concern when faced with ambiguous information (Dugas, et l., 2005).  
Additional research has identified intolerance of uncertainty as a predictor of worry 
(Dugas, Gosselin, & Ladouceur, 2001; Buhr & Dugas, 2006; de Bruin, Rassin, & Muris, 
2006; de Bruin, Rassin, & Muris, 2007; Khawaja & Chapman, 2007), as a risk factor or 
worry (Norton, Sexton, Walker, & Norton, 2005), and a potential cognitive vulnerability 
for excessive and uncontrollable worry (Koerner & Dugas, 2008). 
Summary 
Investigations into the link between worry and problem solving have led to a 
much better understanding of the role worry plays in problem solving.  The findings 
suggest that while worry may not be solely characterized as a problem-solving process, 
one reason for worrying does include the generation of solutions to a problem.  However, 
as worry is not associated with problem solving skills, the failure to implement but not 
generate problem solutions appears to be tied to a decreased confidence n problem-
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solving abilities among worriers.  That is, worriers generate potential solutions to 
problems, but they don’t put those solutions into action due to a lack of confidence in 
their ability to solve the problem.  This consequently results in unresolv d problems.  
Lack of confidence in problem-solving abilities among worriers may arise from poor 
problem orientation and/or an intolerance of uncertainty, both of which have been 
identified as strong predictors of worry.  Poor problem orientation and intolerance of 
uncertainty have also been found to distinguish between individuals with and without 
GAD.  Further, some evidence suggests that intolerance of uncertaity may have a casual 
role in increasing worry. 
Worry as a Cognitive Process 
Worry as Verbally-oriented Thought 
The characterization of worry as a chain of thoughts is valid prima facie.  
However, the inclusion of images in this chain has been challenged to a certain degree.  
Evidence from various research efforts suggests that worry may be better characterized as 
a verbally oriented thought process that is less oriented toward images than non-worry 
cognitions (Borkovec & Inz, 1990; Tallis, Davey, & Capuzzo, 1994; Freeston, Dugas, & 
Ladouceur, 1996).  While assessing thought content during periods of relaxation and 
worry, Borkovec and Inz (1990) found that periods of worry in both GAD clients a d 
non-anxious controls were characterized by a predominance of verbal thought activity 
relative to mental imagery.  This is in contrast to a predominance of mental imagery 
reported by controls during relaxation periods.  GAD clients reported approximately 
equal amounts of thought and mental imagery during relaxation periods.  This is 
important as verbal thought has been shown to result in less arousal associated with fear 
than mental imagery (Tucker & Newman, 1981; Vrana, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1986), which 
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would reduce the efficacy of desensitization exposures requiring sufficient fear activation 
in order provide habituation.  Further, these results seem to suggest two important 
characteristics of worry.  First, that the act of worrying reflects an increase in verbal 
thought activity.  Second, that cognitive correlates of worry appear to be active in 
individuals with GAD even during periods of relaxation. 
The proposition that worry predominantly involves verbally oriented cogniti n 
received further support when Rapee (1993) employed tasks requiring utl zation of the 
different components of working memory (the central executive, the phonological loop, 
and the visuo-spatial sketchpad).  The phonological loop and visuo-spatial ske chpad are 
two of three working memory stores in which visuo-spatial and phonological sensory 
input are briefly stored.  Attention to information to be retained for further encoding is 
managed by the central executive of working memory.  Rapee assessed which of these 
aspects of memory were activated during worry by having participants engage in worry 
while performing these tasks.  Rapee’s findings indicate that tasks requiring simultaneous 
use of the phonological loop and central executive interfered with worry the most, and 
that tasks employing the visuo-spatial sketchpad and the central executive associated with 
visuo-spatial processing had little influence on worry.  Not only do these findings isolate 
worry as a verbally mediated phenomenon, but they point to the possibility that the 
central executive of working memory may have independent components associated with 
phonological and visuo-spatial processing (Rapee, 1993).  In, another study investigating 
the affect of worry on working memory, no association between verbal working-memory 
and worry was found on either a forward digit span task, or reversd digit span task that 
places a resource load on the phonological loop (Crowe, Matthews, & Walkenhorst, 
2007).  However, worry was found to be associated with tasks utilizing the central 
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executive of working memory, suggesting that worry takes up resources required by the 
central executive to redirect attention. 
Another way to assess the relative increase in verbal thought activi y associated 
with worry is by comparing it to an assessment of thought activity associated with 
obsessions (Turner, Beidel, & Stanley, 1992).  Using a non-clinical population, Langlois, 
Freeston, and Ladoucer (2000) had participants identify and describe an obsession-like 
intrusion and a worry, and then evaluated them with the Cognitive Intrusion 
Questionnaire (Freeston, Ladouceur, Thibodeau, & Gagnon, 1992).  Consistent with 
other findings (Wells & Morrison, 1992), they found that obsession-like intrusions 
consisted of more imagery while worry consisted of more verbal, thought activity.  
Lastly, in a study comparing left (verbally oriented) to right (visuouspatially oriented) 
interhemispheric communication, high worriers were found to transfer threatening images 
slower than low worriers (Compton, et al., 2008).  These findings seemto indicate that 
threat information is more slowly translated into image based repres ntations through 
interhemispheric communication among high worriers.  A synthesis of the above findings 
suggests that worry is an internal thought process that primarily consists of verbal 
cognitive activity and content that is activated in response to a triggering stimulus.  
Identifying the precipitants of worry further clarifies both its nature and functions. 
Thematic Content of Worry 
Worry may be activated in anticipation of negative events, and tends to be 
organized into a number of primary themes.  While worry occurs primarily in anticipation 
of potential negative consequences, it is not limited to future events.  Worry about past 
events has been reported to comprise as much as 20% of worry content (Borkovec et al., 
1983).  Recordings of naturally occurring worry content have identifi d that 48% of 
worry reflects problem solving, 17% involves future negative outcomes, and 11% can be 
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identified as rumination, defined as negative aspects of a present or past situation or 
person (Szabo & Lovibond, 2002).  While the percentages vary, a significant, but smaller 
portion of worry does appear to be focused on past events. 
The identification of primary themes of worry has been relatively consistent 
across a number of studies.  In a study of individuals with GAD, Sanderson and Barlow 
(1990) categorized the content of worries obtained in clinical diagnostic interviews as 
most commonly relating to life spheres including family, finances, work, and illness.  
Similar themes have been identified in a non-clinical population.  In the development of a 
measure of non-pathological worry (Tallis, Eysenck, & Mathews, 1992), worry was 
found to cluster into categories including relationships, lack of confidence, aimless 
future, work incompetence, and finances.  Differences between these wo category 
schemes may reflect differences in the dimensions of normal and pathological worry.  In 
a study comparing individuals with and without GAD, Craske, Rapee, Jackel, nd Barlow 
(1989) found that individuals with GAD worried more about issues of health, illness and 
injury than did individuals without GAD.  In addition, individuals with GAD were found 
to worry more about miscellaneous issues.  This has been supported by rsults from a 
similar study by Roemer, Molina, and Borkovec (1997).  However, Roemer and 
colleagues found the most frequent category of worry reported in both gr ups involved 
family and interpersonal issues, and individuals with GAD, while highon worries related 
to work/school, reported lower frequencies of worry in these areas than individuals 
without GAD.  In a more recent investigation, Berenbaum, Thompson, and Pomerantz, 
(2007), identified achievement as the most frequent life domain particints worried 
about, followed by interpersonal and health concerns.  While there are minor differences 
in the category schemes proposed for worry, there appears to be agreement that worry 
primarily involves the categories of work/school, family/relationships, finances, and 
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health.  In addition, individuals with GAD tend to differ somewhat in the cat gory they 
most frequently worry about, and tend to worry more about miscellaneous concerns. 
Worry and Negative Affect 
Worry appears to occur primarily in anticipation of potential negative 
consequences.  A study by Macleod and Byrne (1996) has also demonstrated that 
individuals who score high on a measure of trait worry anticipate mor future negative 
experiences than do individuals who score low on trait worry.  As worry seems closely 
tied to potential or past negative consequences, it seems intuitive that worry is associated 
with negative affect.  Nevertheless, there is evidence to support this association 
(Borkovec at al. 1983; Beck, Perkins, Holder, Robbins, Gray, & Allison, 2001) as well as 
to suggest that worrying produces negative affect (York, Borkovec, Vasey, & Stern, 
1987; Andrews & Borkovec, 1988; Borkovec & Inz, 1990; McLaughlin, Borkovec, & 
Sibrava, 2007).  A study by Fresco, Frankel, Mennin, Turk, and Heimburg (2002) 
investigated the association between worry, rumination, anxiety, and depression in a non-
clinical population.  They identified two worry factors from the P nn State Worry 
Questionnaire (PWSQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990) including worry 
engagement and absence of worry. Employing tests of independent correlations (Bruning 
& Kintz, 1987), they found a stronger association between worry engagement and 
symptoms of depression than the association between a measure of cognitive appraisal 
and symptoms of depression.  This indicates that the association between worry and 
negative affect is not a function of the cognitive appraisal characteristics of worry, but 
rather the degree to which and individual engages in worry.  An analysis of thought 
content during episodes of neutral thought and episodes of worrisome thought indica es 
that episodes of worry contain more negative-affect content (Molina, Borkovec, Peasley, 
& Person, 1998).  Consequently, deeper engagement in worry may result in increased 
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exposure to negative affect-laden content, in turn likely increasing the subjective 
experience of negative affect. 
The Structure of Worry Content in Memory   
Worry related content in memory appears to be organized around worry areas or 
domains (Craske, et al., 1989; Sanderson & Barlow, 1990: Tallis, et al., 1992; Roemer, et 
al., 1997) with content that is tightly clustered together and highly associated (Eysenck, 
1984; Pratt, Tallis, & Eysenck, 1997; Provencher, Freeston, Dugas, Ladouceur, 2000).   
Consistent, with Bower’s (1981; 1987) semantic network theory of mood and 
memory, worry related content appears to be organized in memory in a ma ner similar to 
that proposed for emotion-based content (Eysenck, 1984; Pratt, et al., 1997; Provencher, 
et al., 2000).  As worry is activated in response to and thereby associated with potential 
threat, and is associated with negative affect, it would be intuitively consistent to posit the 
existence of worry categories or nodes within the semantic memory network.  As such, 
the clustering and strong association of worry-related information within this network 
would likely enhance the process of spreading activation, and result in the priming of 
associated worry-related information (Eysenck, 1984; Pratt, et al., 1997; Provencher, et 
al., 2000).  Consequently, worry-related content in memory may be more easily activated 
due to an increased activation level and lower activation threshold.  This in turn may 
result in a higher activation frequency of worry content in memory due to greater cueing 
sensitivity inherent in already primed material.  As previously discussed (Loftus, 1974; 
Anderson, 1976), a higher activation frequency in turn leads to a higher lev l of 
activation and lower activation threshold, thus establishing a semantic memory based 
mechanism through which activation of worry would be capable of both maintaining and 
increasing itself.   
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Summary 
Investigations of the association between worry and negative affect have revealed 
that worry engagement is more strongly associated with symptoms of depression than 
cognitive appraisal.  In addition, worry includes a greater amount of negative affect 
thought content than does non-worry related thought.  As worry has been show  to result 
in increased negative affect, deeper or more frequent engagement in worry would result 
in further exposure to negative affect-laden content that may further increase subjective 
experiences of negative affect.  Thus far, worry appears to consist of a chain of 
predominantly verbal thoughts that are activated in response to potential or past negative 
events, and generally focused on one or more themes including work/school, 
family/relationships, finances, and health.  Episodes of worry are associated with greater 
negative affect and involve negatively affect-laden content.  Worry-related content is 
likely structured within a semantic memory framework in which the content is tightly 
clustered and highly associated.  This clustering and strong association of worry-related 
information would likely increase the activation level and activation frequency of worry-
related content in memory, resulting in enhanced spreading activation in memory and 
reducing the threshold for worry activation.  
Uncontrollable Worry and Thought Suppression 
Controllability 
Difficulty controlling worry is a central diagnostic feature of GAD, and the 
proposition that worry in GAD is relatively uncontrollable has received confirmatory 
support form a variety of areas.  In a study comparing individuals with and without GAD 
on dimensions of worry, Craske et al. (1989) found that individuals with GAD rated their 
worry as less controllable than individuals without GAD.  In addition, indiv duals with 
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GAD tended to rate their worry as relatively uncontrollable while individuals without 
GAD tended to rate their worry as relatively controllable.   
Thought Suppression 
Another approach to evaluating the difficulty of controlling worry is to evaluate 
the success of attempts to suppress worrisome thoughts.  Although few studies have 
investigated efforts to suppress worrisome thoughts (Mathews, & Milroy, 1994b; Becker, 
Rinck, Roth, & Margraf, 1998) and the results are mixed, assessing success or failure of 
thought suppression related to worry may offer important insights into the nature of 
pathological worry. 
The research on thought suppression has grown out of findings that thought 
suppression exerts a paradoxical effect. Attempting to suppress though s actually results 
in a greater frequency of their occurrence (Wegner, Schneider, Carter III, & White, 
1987).  In a study comparing high and low non-clinical worriers, Mathews and Milroy 
(1994b) primed participants with either a brief period of worry, suppression of worry, or 
non-worrying thought.  Following this priming period, they had participants record their 
thoughts at several intervals, and found that high worriers had more worry related 
repetitions across both worry conditions (engage in worry or suppress worry) than low 
worriers.  While the authors cite their findings as a lack of evidence for the hypothesis 
that suppression of upsetting thoughts (worry) increases their intrusivene s, this may be 
an unwarranted conclusion from the findings.  Consistent with the paradoxic l effects of 
thought suppression, it may be argued that both attempts at suppressing worry and 
engaging in it serve to prime worrisome thoughts, and that priming is the mechanism 
through which both of these conditions produced increased worrisome thoughts.  This 
explanation may also account for the finding that high worriers report d more, worrisome 
thoughts and less positive thoughts than low worriers across conditions.  
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In contrast to Mathews and Milroy’s (1994b) findings, Becker et al. (1998) found 
that individuals with GAD had more difficulty suppressing worrisome thoughts than 
other thoughts in contrast to the opposite pattern seen in individuals with public speaking 
phobia and non-anxious controls.  This finding is important as it isolates difficulties in 
suppressing worrisome thoughts to individuals with GAD whereas individuals without 
GAD can suppress worrisome thoughts more effectively.  In addition, the findings 
indicate that individuals with GAD do not have difficulty suppressing all thought activity, 
but rather have particular difficulty in suppressing worrisome thoughts.  As discussed 
previously, explanation of these findings may be related to the structure of worry content 
in the memory of individuals with GAD. 
Cognitive Intrusions and Impairment of Attention 
Further support that worry may be relatively difficult to contrl comes from 
findings that worry results in cognitive intrusions (Borkovec et al., 1983; York et al., 
1987).  By definition, an intrusive thought is difficult to control.  Researchers 
investigating the role of intrusive cognitions and worry have compared deficits in 
attention-focused tasks following exposure to either a worry or non-worry condition 
(Borkovec et al., 1983; York et al., 1987).  Regardless of clinical status, the findings have 
identified greater attentional impairment in individuals in the worry condition than in the 
non-worry condition.  The disruption of attention subsequent to worry activation is 
believed to result from cognitive intrusions related to worry.  As evidence for this, one 
study sampled participants’ thoughts at several intervals during the attention focused task, 
ensuring that worry related thought content was present during the task (Borkovec et al., 
1983).  In discriminating the effect of worry on attention, attentional impairment has been 
isolated as occurring in worriers (Pruzinsky & Borkovec, 1990).  Further evidence 
supports for the proposition that worry influences attentional mechanisms.  For example, 
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worry has been associated with greater attentional interference on dichotic listening tasks 
(Mathews, & Macleod, 1986) as well as modified Stroop tasks (Stroop, 1935; Mogg, 
Mathews & Weiman, 1989; Mathews & Klug, 1993), and has been associ ted with an 
increased load on resources required by the central executive of working memory 
(Crowe, Matthews, & Walkenhorst, 2007; Hayes, Hirsch, & Mathews, 2008).  Most 
recently, the combination of high trait worry and high state anxiety w re found to result 
in impaired attentional disengagement from threat stimuli (Verkuil, Brosschot, Putman, 
& Thayer, 2009), indicating greater attentional focus directed toward threat.  
Summary   
Findings from research in several areas including controllability of worry, thought 
suppression, and thought intrusions have provided greater insight into the uncontrollable 
nature of worry, especially when it is considered pathological.  Individuals with GAD 
tend to rate their worry as relatively uncontrollable.  In contrast, individuals without 
GAD tend to rate their worry as relatively controllable.  The difference between 
individuals with and without GAD in controlling their worry has been reflected in 
findings investigating the suppression of worrisome thoughts.  While, individuals with 
GAD have more difficulty suppressing worrisome thoughts, this deficit appears to be 
restricted to worry-related thoughts, not all thoughts.  It also appears to be specific to 
GAD, as individuals with public speaking phobia do not show this same difficulty.  
While difficulty in suppressing worrisome thoughts has been shown to distinguish 
between individuals with and without GAD, intrusive worrisome thoughts have been 
shown to occur in participants subsequent to the activation of worry regardl ss of their 
clinical status.  This latter finding, in combination with findings derived from 
controllability studies and thought suppression studies, suggests that while worry results 
in an increased level of worry related cognitive intrusions, the ability to suppress those 
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thoughts, and thus exert control over worry, differs depending on an individual’s clinical 
GAD status.  
WORRY AND EMOTIONAL PROCESSING 
Based on evidence suggesting that worry is activated in response to perceived 
threat (potential negative event), it would be reasonable to infer that worry serves an 
important function related to threat and concomitant fear processes.  In order for 
emotional processing to occur, sufficient activation of target fear structures in memory 
must take place and information incompatible with the fear structures must be 
incorporated into new memories (Foa & Kozak, 1986; Rauch & Foa, 2006).  
Consequently, processes that interfere with the activation of fear structures would 
interfere with emotional processing and result in the maintenance of fear.  Borkovec and 
his colleagues (Borkoec & Inz, 1990; Borkovec & Hu, 1990) have proposed that worry 
may interfere with emotional processing by suppressing fear activation in response to 
perceived threat.  Therefore, suppressed fear activation may provide a mechanism for fear 
avoidance through which worry may be negatively reinforced and thus maintained 
(Borkovec, Ray, & Stober, 1998).   
The proposition that worry suppresses fear activation and interferes with 
emotional processing has been supported by a number of findings.  In an experiment on 
the effect of worry on cardiovascular response, Borkovec and Hu (1990) had participants 
with public speaking anxiety undergo a period of relaxation, neutral thought, or worry 
prior to imaginal exposure of a public speaking scenario.  In a comparison of heart rate 
during imaginal exposure, they found that heart rate in response to phobic imagery 
increased less for individuals in the worry than non-worry condition.  As heart rate 
provides a physiological index of fear activation, these findings were presented as an 
indication that worry suppresses subsequent fear activation and consequent motional 
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processing.  Subsequent studies have obtained similar results (Peasley-Milkus & Vrana, 
2000; Castaneda, & Segerstrom, 2004), with others restricting this effect to worry 
involving verbal thought rather than mental imagery or affective focus (Borkovec, 
Lyonfields, Wiser, & Deihl, 1993), and identifying differences between individuals with 
and without GAD (Thayer, Friedman, Borkovec, Johnsen, & Molina, 2000).  Further, 
worrisome thinking was found to negatively predict heart rate reactivity o phobic 
images.  In contrast, relaxation positively predicted heart rate re ctivity (Borkovec et al., 
1993).  This is consistent with other findings suggesting that verbalization of provocative 
material results in less physiological arousal than images of provocative material (Vrana, 
Cuthbert, & Lang, 1986), and that verbalization has also been shown to decrease 
physiological arousal in response to aversive stimuli (Tucker & Newman, 1981).  Finally, 
heart rate reactivity in individuals with GAD has also been associated with orienting and 
defensive responses, implying aberrant attentional control (Thayer et al., 2000). 
SUMMARIZED CONCEPTUALIZATION OF WORRY 
This summary provides a focused review of the material presented about worry up 
to this point that has particular relevance to the rationale underlying this study and future 
sections in this paper.  Thus far, worry appears to consist of a chain of predominantly 
verbal thoughts that are activated in response to potential or past negtive events.  The 
content of worry appears to be generally focused on one or more themes including 
work/school, family/relationships, finances, and health.  Episodes of worry are associated 
with greater negative affect and involve negatively affect-laden content.  Worry-related 
content is tightly clustered and highly associated in memory and likely structured within 
a semantic memory framework.  Given the theoretical properties ascribed to semantic 
networks, this may have important implications for the maintenance of worry related 
cognitive activity, which may play a potential role in worry pathology.  Finally, worry 
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has been show to have intrusive cognitive qualities, which may become difficult to 
control or suppress and interfere with attention.   
Inhibition in Memory 
The exploration of inhibitory processes related to psychological phenomena has 
become increasingly prominent across various psychological disciplines.  This is likely a 
reflection of inhibitions broad utility as an explanatory concept.  However it has also 
resulted in an ill defined application of inhibition as a concept.  In general, inhibition is 
defined as a process that results in the suppressed activation or initiation of a subsequent 
event.  For the purpose of this review, the following exploration of inhib tory processes 
will be restricted to the role of inhibition in memory.  
RETRIEVAL INDUCED FORGETTING : NON-VOLITIONAL INHIBITION  
Recently, inhibitory processes have been implicated as playing a role in the 
activation of semantically related content in memory (Anderson Bjork, & Bjork, 1994; 
Anderson & Spellman, 1995).  As such, inhibitory processes may also play an important 
role in the experience and appraisal of mood activated through processes in memory.  For 
example, inhibition may serve as one mechanism through which Bower (1987; 1989) has 
proposed that the appraisal of information and/or stimuli associated wih mood can occur 
independently of an emotional response.  As presented previously, a mechnism allowing 
for such a process would be evolutionarily advantageous, allowing for individuals to 
make decisions and respond based on evaluation of mood instead of acting reflexively, 
forced to respond to their emotional experience. 
Consistent with a dual process model of memory retrieval, activation of target 
material for retrieval from memory may spread broadly across target associated material.  
Inhibition may suppress the activation of associated non-target matrial, aiding in the 
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selective activation and retrieval of targeted material, but not associated non-target 
material.  Applying similar processes to the activation of different propositions in 
memory related to mood, spreading activation may result in the incrased activation 
potential of all propositions related to the mood, while inhibition may function to 
suppress those associated propositions involved in initiating the mood experience.  Thus, 
similar to the role of inhibition in a dual process model of memory retrieval, inhibition 
may aid in the selective activation of information necessary for m od appraisal by 
suppressing associated mood propositions involved in mood activation.  For example, n 
individual who was mugged in a grocery store parking lot would have propositions 
related to being mugged that would include such things as parking lots are dangerous and 
it is not safe to leave a grocery store.  Other propositions about muggings would be 
response associated such as run, call for help, do exactly what you’re told, or fight.  
Inhibition of response associated propositions (i.e. run, fight) would enable an individual 
to appraise the degree of threat they assign to parking lots so that they are not in a state of 
perpetual responding.  Further, the ability to suppress behavioral responding and 
cognitively appraise information associated with the fear of being mugged would aid an 
individual in emotionally processing and recovering from the traumatic experience of 
being mugged (Foa & Kozak, 1986; Rauch & Foa, 2006). 
The hypothesis that inhibition may serve as a companion process to excitation in 
selectively activating content in memory is supported by resea ch on retrieval induced 
forgetting (Anderson et al, 1994; Anderson & Spellman, 1995).  In retrieval nduced 
forgetting, inhibition is believed to serve as a mechanism that suppresses the activation of 
associated non-target material, thus aiding in the selective retri val of target material 
from memory.  Employing the retrieval practice paradigm (RPP), Anderson et al. (1994) 
and Anderson & Spellman (1995) demonstrated that the repeated retrieval practice of 
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category nouns resulted in a later recall decrement for other, cat gory-associated nouns, 
that were not practiced compared to the recall of category-unassoci ted nouns that were 
also unpracticed.  The difference in recall between unpracticed wor s associated with 
versus unassociated with the retrieval-practiced words provides a measure of inhibition.  
Some debate remains as to whether the retrieval induced forgetting ffect actually results 
from inhibitory processes in memory (Johansson, Aslan, Bauml, Gabel, & Mecklinger, 
2007; Bauml, 2007), or whether other processes may better account for the effect 
(Perfect, Moulin, Conway, & Perry, 2002; Camp, Pecher, & Schmidt, 2007).  However, 
the preponderance of evidence favors an inhibitory account of retrieval induced 
forgetting for explicit memory tests where retrieval practice is conducted in a category 
stem-cue format. 
As inhibition occurring through retrieval induced forgetting is not posited to result 
from motivated attempts to suppress the retrieval of unpracticed wor s, it may be 
conceptualized as a non-volitional form of inhibition in memory that occurs through 
automatic processes.  Further, because non-volitional inhibition occurs through non-
conscious, automatic processes, it may reflect and thus serve as a potential measure of 
inhibitory capacity. 
DIRECTED FORGETTING : VOLITIONAL INHIBITION  
Another manifestation of inhibition in memory occurs through motivated efforts 
to forget information.  In investigations of directed forgetting (Elmes, Adams, & 
Roediger, 1970; Epstein, 1970; Block, 1971; Epstein & Wilder, 1972; Bjork & 
Woodward, 1973), participants receive instructions to either forget or remember stimuli 
presented for learning.  Later participants were instructed to recall all stimuli regardless 
of the previous instructional set.  Inhibition of to-be-forgotten words has been proposed 
as one explanation for the findings that participants recall less to-be-forgotten than to-be-
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remembered words (Bjork, 1989; MacLeod, 1989).  While the role of inhibition as a
mechanism underlying directed forgetting effects is still under debate, the evidence tends 
to indicate that inhibition is one of the primary mechanisms underlying directed 
forgetting using the list method (Basden, Basden, & Gargano, 1993; Johnson, 1994; 
MacLeod, 1999).  Other processes such as differential encoding are likely responsible for 
directed forgetting that occurs with the item-by-item method (Woodwar  & Bjork, 1971; 
Basden et al., 1993).  In the list method of the DFT, participants receive instructions to 
forget words they were just presented for learning after half of the words from an entire 
word list have been presented.  Inhibition of to-be-forgotten words is reflected in the free 
recall difference between to-be-remembered and to-be-forgotten words.  Because this 
inhibition is believed to result from motivated attempts to forget ma erial, it may be 
conceptualized as a volitional form of inhibition in memory. 
Worry, Emotional Processing, and Memory-based Inhibit on  
INHIBITION AND SEMANTIC NETWORK THEORIES OF EMOTION AND MEMORY  
Memory-based theories of emotion and emotional processing (Bower, 1981; 
1987; Foa & Kozak, 1986) have been offered to provide a cognitive framework capable 
of explaining variation in emotional activation and experiences.  Findings that emotion-
related stimuli may be differentially processed depending on induced or long standing 
mood state have been offered to support his framework.  However, while these theories 
possess explanatory value for findings that some induced and most long standing 
emotional states (particularly anxiety) are commonly associated with biases for attending 
to, perceiving, and processing mood congruent stimuli, they appear inadequate to account 
for an at-best inconsistent ability to detect similar biases in recall. 
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Differing explanations may account for the failure to consistently detect emotion-
based biases in recall related to anxiety. One possibility is that the ability to detect such 
recall effects is methodologically dependent, and that a methodology capable of reliably 
demonstrating such effects has not yet been identified.  Another possibility is that the 
current theoretical models are inadequate in this regard.  Current evidence suggests that 
both explanations may be likely. 
A predominance of failures to detect emotion-based recall effects, primarily 
related to anxiety, may be due to a reliance on methodologies using recall (i.e. number of 
words recalled) as an outcome measure to compare the effects of mood state (induced or 
long standing) or stimuli characteristics (mood congruent vs. mood incongruent) on 
memory.  A more effective approach may be to rely on the use of memory-based 
paradigms that are capable of capturing underlying processes hypothesized to be involved 
in governing the activation of information in memory.  A number of studies have 
employed such paradigms successfully, including directed forgettin  asks (Elmes, 
Adams, & Roediger, 1970; Epstein, 1970; Block, 1971; Epstein & Wilder, 1972; Bjork & 
Woodward, 1973) and the retrieval practice paradigm (Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994, 
Anderson & Spellman, 1995), to investigate the association between inhibitory 
functioning in memory and factors including mood (Power, Dalgleish, Claudio, Tata, & 
Kentish, 2000; Barnier, Hung, & Conway, 2004; Bauml & Kuhbandner, 2007; Minnema 
& Knowlton, 2008), dissociation (Elzinga, Phaf, Van Ardon, & Dyck, 2003) personality 
(Korfine & Hooley, 2000), response to traumatic stress (Zoellner, Sacks, & Foa, 2003; 
Cottencin et al., 2006; Geraerts & McNally; 2008, Amir, Badour, Freese, 2009), anxiety 
(Amir, Coles, Brigidi, & Foa, 2001; Zoelnner, Sacks, & Foa, 2003;), and worry (B own, 
Tucker, & Telch, unpublished manuscript).   
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The emerging growth of findings that inhibitory processes in memory ay play a 
significant role in several areas including normal and pathological variations in emotion, 
and even personality, suggests that current memory-based theories may be well advised 
to incorporate inhibitory processes as operational mechanisms within the theory.  It is 
suggested that incorporating inhibitory processes as a mechanism within a theoretical 
framework would enhance the viability of existing or new memory-based theories of 
emotion and emotional processing. 
This proposition is partially supported by the previously cited studies, but it is 
further grounded in a logical argument based on an apparent disconnect between the 
memory-based theories of emotion presented and known neurological processes.  While 
an in depth review of the neurological underpinnings of cognition and emotion are 
beyond the scope of this review, a couple of basic statements should suffice for the 
proposed argument.  At multiple levels of neurological functioning, including neuronal 
communication and communication between different regions in the brain via eural 
pathways, activation of neural processes is not solely determined by excitatory 
influences.  Inhibitory processes play an integral, companion role in governing the 
activation of neural processes.  As such, cognitive theories that rely solely on differential 
levels of activation, without incorporating inhibition as a mechanism involved in control 
of such activation, fail to provide an information processing framework consistent with 
the functional characteristics understood to govern neurological processes.  Recent 
empirical support for such a position has emerged from a study investigating the 
neurological underpinnings of memory suppression (Anderson, Ochsner, Kuhl, Cooper, 
Robertson, Gabrieli, et al., 2004).  Using event based fMRI during the administration of a 
think/no-think task, Anderson et al. (2004) found that suppression of unwanted memories 
corresponded with increased dorsolaterial prefrontal cortex activation.  An area of the 
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brain believed to be important in emotional and behavior regulation thrug  its inhibitory 
output to other brain regions.  In addition, reduced hippocampal activation was also 
related to control of unwanted memories.  Both increased prefrontal cor ical activity and 
decreased right hemispheric hippocampus activity predicted the degree of forgetting in 
this task. 
Even given the arguments and evidence presented, asserting the importance of 
incorporating inhibitory processes into memory theories of emotion must remain 
equivocal until a number of questions can be addressed.  There currently is li tle 
understanding of the factors that influence both normal and pathological vari tion of 
inhibitory functioning in memory.  Specifically with respect to a semantic network theory 
of mood (Bower, 1981; 1987), how might memory-based inhibition vary with respect to 
categorical associations of stimuli versus more general affective qualities?  Further, how 
might these category and affective qualities interact to influence inhibition?  In a different 
vein, other questions meriting investigation are inspired by the possible existence of 
different forms of inhibition in memory.  More specifically, how might volitional 
inhibition, arising from motivated efforts to forget information, be related to non-
volitional inhibition, arising from more automatic forgetting processes resulting from 
retrieval induced forgetting?  It is possible that each of these forms of inhibition function 
independently; however this seems unlikely.  Positing that non-volitiona inhibition 
driven by automatic processes may provide a measure of inhibitory capacity, non-
volitional inhibition may serve to mediate the relationship between volitional inhibition 
and factors found to influence it. 
MEMORY BASED INHIBITION AND EMOTIONAL PROCESSING 
In the theory of emotional processing (Foa & Kozak, 1986; Rauch & Foa, 2006), 
emotional processing is defined based on the processing of fear, th  reduction of fear for 
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a stimulus or event based on integration of counter-threat evidence in memory.  As fear is 
one of the primary mood states, it would be one of the emotions included in a semantic 
network theory of emotion and memory (Bower, 1981; 1987).  Therefore the arguments 
presented in the preceding section, relating to the inclusion of inhibiton as a mechanism 
in a memory-based theory of emotion, would be applicable to emotional processing.  
However, it is presented here distinctly to highlight a number of important consequences 
and factors involved in the processing of fear, further supporting the sugge tion that 
inhibitory processes may play an important role in governing memory-based emotional 
activation in general, and play a specific role in emotional processing of fear. 
In Bower’s commentary (1987) on his semantic network theory of mood and 
memory, he raises the point that the activation characteristics of a semantic network 
would enable the activation and cognitive appraisal of an emotion without resulting in the 
simultaneous subjective experience, physiological response, and initiatio  of behavioral 
responses associated with the mood.  With respect to fear, this has significant adaptive 
implications.  Absent the ability to suppress behavioral responding and physiological 
arousal in order to accurately appraise threat, an individual would have a maladaptive 
tendency to over-respond to many environmental threat cues that do not represent “true” 
threat.  However, cognitive threat appraisal alone, constantly absent physiological and 
behavioral threat responses, would be equally maladaptive, increasing the likelihood of 
bodily injury or early death.  Therefore, an adaptive system must work to integrate these 
processes in a manner that results in suppression of physiological and behavioral 
responses when the threat is appraised as “false”, but increased activation when the threat 
is appraised as “true.”  Similarly this system must be capable of suppressing cognitive 
appraisal in favor of immediate action when threat is imminent.  I  order to accomplish 
such goals there must be a system of communication that allows for reciprocal feedback 
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between these processes, and enables both the activation and suppression of responses 
based on situational demands.   
LeDoux (1989; 2000) has proposed a dual pathway theory of emotional activation 
in the brain that is capable of satisfying the adaptive demands just presented.  In this 
model, two emotional pathways including a fast and slow path exist.  The fast path 
initiates in brain structures responsible for quick behavioral and physiological responses, 
and the slow path initiates in brain structures that are involved in executive functions 
such as planning and appraisal.  The set of neurological structures involved in each 
pathway are capable of influencing each other through both excitatory nd inhibitory 
inputs.  Thus, the slow path can suppress fast-path activation of physiological arousal and 
behavioral responding in favor of further threat appraisal, and the fast path can suppress 
or override slow-path activation in order to suspend cognitive threat appraisal in favor of 
immediately initiating physiological arousal and behavior necessary to successfully cope 
with imminent threat.  Although LeDoux’s (1989; 2000) theory focuses on the 
neurological foundations for processing emotion, with important implications for the 
processing of fear, it may also offer insight into the mechanisms required in a semantic 
memory model of emotional processing.  More specifically, if inhibitory processes 
capable of suppressing situation-dependent maladaptive fear responses fu ction at a 
neurological level, it would be consistent to posit analogous inhibitory processes at work 
within the memory system capable of yielding the same results. 
MEMORY -BASED INHIBITION AND WORRY 
The prospect that inhibition may play an important role related to worry is 
implied by a number of characteristics related to the nature and functions of worry and 
the theoretical properties posited to exist in semantic network theories of memory, 
particularly those involving memory and emotion.  Worry-related content in memory 
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appears to be tightly clustered, highly associated, and organized around central themes, 
implying that worry-related content may fit well within a semantic network model of 
memory.  In addition, the activation of worry has been shown to increase intrusive 
cognitions, which interfere with attention, and may be particularly difficult to control or 
suppress in individuals with high levels of worry and/or GAD. 
Given the theoretical properties ascribed to semantic networks, spreading 
activation and a high frequency of activating worry-related content in memory may result 
in the priming of worry related content in memory.  This in turn may le d to a higher 
activation level and lower activation threshold for worry, and contribute to a self-
maintaining cycle of worry activation.  Further, considering that worry is associated with 
cognitive intrusions, uncontrollability at pathological levels, failed efforts at thought 
suppression, and attentional interference, pathological levels of worry may result in an 
activational cascade of worry-related content to the exclusion of other important 
cognitive content and/or processes.  Partial evidence for this comes from the finding that 
priming worry results in impaired recall of emotional material (Lehtonen, et al., 2009).  
At normal levels, worry appears to involve the heightened activation of related content in 
memory.   
Given the characteristics associated with worry listed above, worry serves as an 
ideal focus of investigations exploring mechanisms involved in a semantic network 
theory of mood.  The identification of worry resulting in cognitive intrusions that are at 
times difficult to suppress, and findings that worry may interfer with attention suggests 
the possibility that processes that function to regulate such activities may underlie these 
effects.  Consequently, inhibitory processes involved in motivated or automtic control of 
thoughts and attention in memory may play an important role.  Further, if inhibitory 
processes do govern such activities, inhibitory dysfunction may serve as pathological 
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factor underlying the inability to suppress worrisome thoughts by individuals with GAD.  
As inhibitory processes function to suppress activation, decreased levels of inhibition 
may result in increased cognitive intrusions, and if inhibition is decreased to a 
dysfunctional level, the ability to suppress worry-related intrusions may be compromised, 
thus contributing to the pathological maintenance of worry. 
INHIBITION , EMOTIONAL PROCESSING, AND WORRY 
A number of explanations have been offered to account for findings supporting 
the proposition that worry suppresses the activation of fear and consequently interferes 
with emotional processing.  First, worry might influence emotional processing via diffuse 
mechanisms such as attention. Support for this explanation comes from findings that 
attentional disruption is sufficient to negatively influence emotional processing (Grayson, 
Foa, & Steketee, 1982; Sartory, Rachman, & Grey, 1982; Kamphuis & Telch, 202000; 
Telch et al, 2004), and that worry disrupts attention (Borkovec et al., 1983; York et al., 
1987; Pruzinsky & Borkovec, 1990).  A second possibility is that worry ma result in a 
cascade of worry-related activation in memory that imposes significant demands on 
cognitive resources.  Consequently, worry may commandeer cognitive resources needed 
by other cognitive systems in general, and more specifically, cognitive resources within 
memory needed to activate fear structures.  Thirdly, because activation of worry-related 
content in memory may be self-perpetuating and lower the activation threshold of worry-
related content, such content may be the most readily retrievable information from 
memory.  Positing that worry is a cognitive appraisal process, memory content related to 
threat appraisal rather than fear activation may be more strongly associated with worry.  
Consequently, a higher activation level and activation frequency of appraisal- elated 
content may leave content involved in activating fear structures relatively less available 
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for memory activation and retrieval, resulting in less fear activ tion and emotional 
processing.   
Another set of explanations derives from the identification of worry as primarily a 
verbal cognitive process.  As presented in the section on worry and emotional processing, 
suppressed heart rate reactivity to fear stimuli following worry exposure has been 
restricted to worry involving verbal thought rather than mental imgery or affective focus 
(Borkovec, Lyonfields, Wiser, & Deihl, 1993).  In general, verbalization is a less potent 
activator of fear than mental imagery.   
Another possibility provides the primary basis for the proposed study.  Worry 
may result in the activation of inhibitory processes in memory that suppress the activation 
of fearful propositions, decreasing fear activation and thus enabling the suspension of 
behavioral responding and enhancing cognitive appraisal and problem solving (Brown, et 
al., unpublished manuscript).   
This proposition has received some support in a recent investigation of trait worry 
as a predictor of change in non-volitional inhibition following exposure to a potentially 
threatening situation (Brown et al., submitted manuscript).  In this study, participants 
completed the retrieval practice paradigm prior to and following a xiety induction.  
Higher levels of trait worry as measured by the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; 
Meyer, et al., 1990) were found to predict increases in non-volitional inhibition in the 
anxiety induction condition, but decreases in the no-anxiety control condition (See figure 
1 below).  What makes these findings most interesting is the fact th t measures of 
inhibition were obtained for neutral words, unrelated to either worry or anxiety.  In 
another study, participants with GAD were found to be less able to intentionally forget 
threat information on a directed forgetting task (Albu, 2008).  Taken together, findings 
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from these studies indicate that worry may be associated with increased inhibitio  of non-
threat material and decreased inhibition of threat-related material in memory. 
Figure 1: Change in Inhibition Measured by the RPP as a Function of Anxiety 





























The finding that trait worry predicts changes in the inhibition of material 
unrelated to worry when anxiety is present poses a number of interesting questions about 
how semantic stimuli characteristics may influence inhibition.  It further raises questions 
about how inhibition may be influenced by the affective characteristics of stimuli as well 
as the semantic association of stimuli with worry.  A number of possibilities regarding 
these issues exist.  Inhibitory processes associated with worry may function primarily 
through semantic stimuli characteristics, primarily through affective stimuli 
characteristics, or similarly through both.  Whichever the case, investigations of 
inhibitory processes associated with worry provide an excellent opportunity to greatly 
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increase current understanding of how inhibitory processes function in memory, and 
offers implications for understanding how semantic networks of memory and mood are 
organized.  Further, investigating both volitional and non-volitional forms of inhibition in 
memory enables an understanding of how these processes may work, independently, in 
concert, or through one or the other to govern the activation of informatin in memory, as 
well as the processing of emotional information in particular. 
Current Study Design and Hypotheses 
EXPERIMENTAL GOALS AND DESIGN OVERVIEW  
The current study was inspired by connections identified between semantic 
network theories of mood, emotional processing theory, and implications regarding the 
nature and functions of worry.  The overall objective of this study was to better 
understand different kinds of inhibitory processes in memory as well as factors that may 
influence and/or interact with these processes. This study examined the relationship 
between different types of inhibition in memory and other cognitive processes including 
worry and thought suppression.  It followed and expanded on previous findings that 
changes in verbal memory inhibition, in response to potential threat, a associated with 
trait worry (Brown et al., unpublished manuscript), and was specifically designed to 
pursue five main objectives: 
1. Develop a greater understanding of normal variation in memory-based inhibition 
including the relationship between inhibition and individual difference factors 
such as efforts at thought suppression and trait worry.   
2. Identify factors that influence inhibitory functioning in memory including 
identifying the manner of influence exerted by these factors.  Specifically, to 
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identify the effects of induced worry, semantic association of stimuli to worry, 
and the affective valence of stimuli on inhibition in memory.   
3. Investigate the possibility that inhibitory processes in memory ma serve as a 
mechanism through which worry influences emotional processing.   
4. Examine the relationship between different varieties of inhibition in memory, and 
test a model of mediation including volitional and non-volitional forms of 
inhibition.  More specifically, to test the proposition that relationship  between 
volitional inhibition in memory and other factors are mediated by non-volitional 
inhibition which may serve as a measure of inhibitory capacity.   
5. Explored the viability of inhibitory functioning as: 
a. A process underlying efforts at thought suppression. 
b. A mechanism underlying both normal and pathological worry.   
These study goals served as steps toward evaluating the potential for memory-
based inhibitory functioning to serve as a pathogenic mechanism in the development and 
maintenance of pathological worry and GAD. 
In order to achieve the study objectives, a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed-subjects d sign was 
employed to investigate moderator effects of trait worry and thought suppression for both 
volitional and non-volitional forms of inhibition under different stimulus and thought-
induction conditions.  Worry condition (worry induction vs. neutral thought) and 
affective valence (positive vs. negative affect words) served as between-subjects factors.  
Semantic association of word stimuli to spheres of worry (worry vs. non-worry 
categories) served as a within-subjects factor.  Measures of volitional and non-volitional 
inhibition obtained with the DFT and RPP respectively served as the DVs.  The 
development of the RPP and DFTs, capable of capturing inhibitory processes involved in 
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memory, provided an opportunity to directly examine the role of memory-based 
inhibition in emotional processes.   
Repeated measures of non-volitional inhibition for worry and non-worry 
categories were obtained by repeated administrations of the RPP.  Non-volitional 
inhibition, measured by each RPP, was calculated based on the differential free-recall 
percentage between non-practice words associated with and unassociated w th the 
retrieval practice categories.  Volitional inhibition measured with the DFT was calculated 
based on the differential free-recall percentage of to-be-rem mbered and to-be-forgotten 
words.  Calculation of inhibition based on differences in percent free-recall provided 
equivalent scaling of inhibition measured in the RPP and DFT.   
Measures of trait worry and thought suppression, obtained from the PSWQ 
(Meyer, et al., 1990) and White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI; Wegner & Zanakos, 
1994) respectively, served as predictor variables.  Measures of depressive symptoms 
obtained from the BDI served as a variable controlled for in the study.   Measures of 
attention, subjective worry, and negative affect were collected in order to check the 
effectiveness of the thought induction manipulation. 
HYPOTHESES 
The primary hypotheses under investigation were predicted 4-way interactions 
between thought induction condition (worry vs. neutral thought), semantic asso i tion of 
word stimuli to domains of worry (associated vs. unassociated), affective valence of word 
stimuli (positive vs. negative), and the predictor variables of either trait worry or thought 
suppression on inhibition.  The interaction of induction condition, semantic asso i tion of 
words with categories of worry, and affective valence of words were hypothesized to 
moderate the relationship between inhibition and the predictors of trait worry and thought 
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suppression.  Specific predictions regarding nature of these interactions are presented in 
the following sections. 
As measures of thought suppression have been found to positively correlate with 
measures of worry (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994), the hypothesized results for the 
relationship between thought suppression and inhibition mirror those hypothesized for 
measures of trait worry.  The predicted relationships between worry and inhibition were 
not expected to differ based on the type of inhibition measured (volitional or non-
volitional). 
Trait Worry, Thought Induction, and Semantic Association 
Hypotheses in this section explore an expected 3-way interaction between 
semantic association with worry (worry vs. non-worry category words), type of induced 
thought (worry vs. neutral) and trait worry on inhibition.   Figure 2 provides a graphic 
depiction of the expected association between trait worry based on the semantic 
association of words with categories of worry and thought induction condition. 
1. For words semantically associated with worry, it was expected that higher levels 
of trait worry would be associated with lower levels of inhibition, a d that this 
relationship was expected to be stronger in the induced worry condition.  
2. For words semantically unassociated with worry, it was expected that higher 
levels of trait worry would be associated with higher levels of inhibition, and that 
this relationship would only be present in the induced worry condition. 
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Figure 2: Hypothesized Interaction Between Type of Thought Induction, Semantic 
Category Association to Worry, and Trait Worry.  Note: Hypothesized 









































W orry N eutra l Thought
 
 Worry vs. Non-worry Semantic Category and Affective Valence 
The following hypotheses expand on the 3-way interaction proposed thus far by
including stimuli affective valence as an additional factor for consideration.  With the 
inclusion of stimuli affective valence as a factor, a 4-way interaction was predicted such 
that word affective valence was expected to moderate the relationship between trait worry 
and inhibition under different conditions of induced thought and semantic association of 
words to worry categories.  
1. In the absence of induced worry (neutral thought), the relationship between trait 
worry and inhibition based on semantic association of stimuli to worry was 
expected to differ depending on the affective valence of the stimuli.   
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a. For stimuli semantically unassociated with domains of worry, no 
relationship between trait worry and inhibition was expected based on the 
affective valence of stimuli.  Because these words are semantically 
unassociated with worry, trait worry was not predicted to be associ ted 
with activation of these words in memory. 
b. For stimuli semantically associated with worry, the relationship between 
trait worry and inhibition was expected to differ based on the affective 
valence of the word stimuli.  This prediction drew on findings thathigher 
levels of trait worry are associated with increased inhibition of neutral 
words that are semantically unassociated with worry following the
induction of anxiety (Brown, Tucker, & Telch, unpublished manuscript).  
Thus, the relationship between trait worry and inhibition may be 
moderated by affective characteristics of stimuli even when the stimuli are 
all semantically associated with worry.  Consequently, the following 
relationships were predicted. 
i. Higher levels of trait worry were expected to be associated with 
higher levels of inhibition for positive stimuli semantically 
associated with worry. 
ii.  Higher levels of trait worry were expected to be associated with 
lower levels of inhibition for negative information semantically 
associated with worry. 
2. When worry was induced, the relationship between trait worry and inhibition of 
words semantically associated with worry was expected to differ based on the 
affective valence of those words.  Without this differentiation based on stimuli 
affective valence, it would be expected for higher levels of trait worry to be 
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associated with lower levels of inhibition.  However, with the inclusion of stimuli 
affective valence as a factor, this relationship was expected to change based on 
positive or negative affective valence.  Under this condition the following 
predictions were made. 
i. Higher levels of trait worry were expected to be associated with 
higher levels of inhibition of positive affective stimuli. 
ii.  Higher levels of trait worry were expected to be associated with 
lower levels of inhibition of negative affective stimuli. 
3. The strongest relationship between trait worry and inhibition was expected to 
occur for both negative and positive stimuli when worry was induced and the 
stimuli were semantically associated with worry. 
Non-volitional Inhibition as a Mediator 
It is possible that a non-volitional cognitive process may govern to some extent 
the capacity and limitations of the same cognitive process employed volitionally.  In this 
case, non-volitional inhibition was expected to govern the extent to which volitional 
inhibition was enacted and thus mediate the relationship between volitional inhibition and 
other factors such as trait worry and thought suppression (see Figures 3 & 4).  More 
specifically, if trait characteristics such as trait worry or thought suppression are 
associated with how someone is able to volitionally inhibit information in memory, this 
was expected work through non-volitional control of their inhibitory processes. 
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Participants included 86 undergraduate students (44 males & 42 females) enrolled 
in an introductory psychology course at the University of Texas at Aus in.  Participants 
were from varied ethnic backgrounds including 45 Caucasians, 20 Asian Americans, 15 
Hispanic Americans, 2 African Americans, 1 Indian American, 1 Persian American, and 
2 unknown resulting from participant objection to reporting there ethnicity.  They ranged 
in age from 17 to 22-years old (M = 18.87, SD = .87).  Of the 86 participants, 5 reported 
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having received a prior diagnosis of ADHD.  No participants endorsed being on 
medication for depression or attention problems at the time of the study.   
Involvement in this study satisfied part of the course requirement for research 
participation.  A total of three participants who endorsed active suicidal ideation on the 
BDI were excluded from participation in order to minimize the risk to this group resulting 
from negative mood effects associated with worry induction.  No compensation was 
provided for participation.  All participants were treated in accordance with ethical 





Trait worry was assessed by self-report with the Penn State Worry Questionnaire 
(PSWQ; Meyer, et al., 1990).  The PSWQ is a 16-item questionnaire th t assesses trait 
worry based on the quantity and controllability of worry (see Appendix B1).  Each item is 
rated on a 1-5 point scale (1= not at all typical & 5 = very typical), and 5 of the 16 PSWQ 
items are reverse scored.  The PSWQ has demonstrated high internal consistency (α = 
.93), excellent test-retest reliability (r = .92), and good discriminant validity in detecting 
GAD among college students (Meyer, et al., 1990).  An investigation of the psychometric 
properties of the PSWQ in a clinical population (Brown, Antony, & Barlow, 1992) found 
that the mean score on the PSWQ for individuals meeting diagnostic criteria for GAD is 
68.11 with a standard deviation of 9.59.  The mean score for individuals who do not meet 
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diagnostic criteria for any DSM-IV (APA, 1994) anxiety disorder is 34.90 with a 
standard deviation of 10.98. 
Idiopathic Worry Domains 
Idiopathic domains of worry used for worry induction were assessed with the 
Student Worry Questionnaire (SWQ; Osman, Gutierrez, Downs, Koppler, Bar ios, & 
Haraburda, 2001).  The SWQ is a 30-item subjective self-report measur  of 6 worry 
domains for a student population (see Appendix B2).  The six domains of worry assessed 
by the SWQ include worrisome thinking, financial related concerns, significant others’ 
well being, social adequacy concerns, academic concerns, and general anxiety symptoms.  
Items on the SWQ are rated on a zero to four Likert scale representing how characteristic 
the statement of the individual (0 = Almost Never characteristic of me & 4 = Almost 
Always characteristic of me).  The SWQ has demonstrated high internal consistency (α = 
.94) and good test-retest reliability (r = .86).  The SWQ has also demonstrated adequate 
convergent validity with the PSWQ (r = .76) and the State Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait 
version (r = .64; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970).   
Thought Suppression 
The White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994) was 
used to obtain measures of thought control characterized by efforts to suppress thoughts.  
The WBSI is a 15-item self-report measure of efforts to av id unwanted thoughts (see 
Appendix B3).  Each item on the WBSI is rated on a 5-point scale from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).  It has demonstrated good internal co sistency ranging 
from α = .87 to .89 in different samples.  The test-retest reliability of the WBSI was 
demonstrated to be excellent over a 1-week period (r = .92) and acceptable over a 3-
month period (r = .69).  An association between the WBSI and measures of OCD, 
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depression, state anxiety, anxiety sensitivity, and GAD has also been demonstrated 
(Wegner & Zanakos, 1994; McKay & Greensberg, 2002). 
Depression 
The Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) was 
used in order to measure current symptoms of depression.  The BDI-II is a 21-item self-
report measure assessing severity of depression including a cognitive-affective dimension 
and a somatic-vegetative symptom dimension (Dozois, Dobson, & Ahnberg, 1998).  Each 
item on the BDI-II is rated on a 4-point scale (0-3) based on 4 statements that represent 
successively increasing symptom severity and correspond to the incr asing scale 
numbers.  The BDI-II has demonstrated good internal consistency (α = .89 - .91) in two 
college samples (Steer & Clark, 1997; Dozois et al., 1998).  The BDI-II has demonstrated 
convergent validity with the earlier version (BDI) and been shown do demonstrate some 
clinical utility in differentiating between depressed and non-depressed college students 
(Dozois et al., 1998). 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder 
Initial screening for GAD diagnoses was conducted using the GADQ-IV 
(Newman, Zuellig, Kachin, Constantino, Przeworski, & Erickson, 2002).  The GADQ – 
IV (see Appendix B4) is a self-report diagnostic measure of GAD based on DSM-IV 
diagnostic criteria for GAD (APA, 1994).  It consists of relevant diagnostic questions 
related to the experience of uncontrollable and excessive worry, the occurrence of 
uncontrollable and excessive worry for the past six months, the degree to which worry 
interferes with normal functioning, and the presence of three out of six associated 
symptom groups.  In a preliminary investigation with a group of 142 undergraduate 
students, 90 of whom were interested in obtaining diagnoses, including non anxi us 
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controls, and participants with social phobia, GAD, or panic disorder, the GADQ-IV 
identified 30 cases of GAD as a primary or secondary diagnosis (Newman, et al., 2002).   
In this sample, the GADQ-IV was shown to have 89% specificity and 83% sensitivity in 
diagnosing GAD.  It has also demonstrated adequate test-retest reliability, and convergent 
and discriminant validity.  It has further been shown to have agreement with a structured 
diagnostic interview comparable to the agreement between two raters using the same 
structured interview.  
Trait Anxiety 
Trait anxiety was measured using the STAI-T (Spielberger, et al., 1970).  The 
STAI-T is a measure of trait anxiety that asks participants to rate how they feel in general 
for each of 20 items that represent positive and negative feelings o  a four-point Likert-
type scale (1 = almost never and 4 = almost always).  Trait anxiety is posited to represent 
an individual’s tendency to perceive potential threat in the environment.  The STAI-T has 
demonstrated high internal consistency, reported around 0.90 (Spielberger, et al., 1970). 
CLINICAL ASSESSMENT 
Structured Diagnostic Interview: GAD 
Composite International Diagnostic Interview (CIDI-2.1) 
Follow-up assessment of GAD status for individuals meeting clinical criteria on 
the GADQ-IV was conducted with the CIDI-2.1.  The CIDI-2.1 is a fully structured 
interview available in a computerized version that allows for administration by 
interviewer and scoring by computer algorithms.  Owing to time constraints dictated by 
the experimental focus of the proposed study, only the GAD section of the anxiety 
disorders module from the CIDI-2.1 was used. 
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The CIDI-1.0 was developed through the Joint Project on Diagnosis and 
Classification of Mental Health Disorders in Alcohol and Drug-Related Problems under 
the rubric of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the former Alcohol, Drug 
Abuse, and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA).  The CIDI-1.0 was designed as a 
multicultural, fully standardized and comprehensive diagnostic interview for mental 
disorders based on the ICD-10 (WHO, 1991) and DSM-III-R (APA, 1987) criteria.  
Changes in DSM criteria resulting from the introduction of DSM- IV (APA, 1994) have 
resulted in revisions of the CIDI-1.0 and subsequent development of the CIDI-2.1.  As 
initial development of the CIDI-1.0 was based on earlier diagnostic systems, most of the 
psychometric information available derives from investigations comparing this earlier 
version with the earlier DSM-III-R diagnostic system (Witchen, Robins, Cottler, 
Sartorius, Burke, & Regier, 1991; Wittchen, 1994; Peters & Andrews, 1995; Wittchen, 
Kessler, Zhao, & Abelson, 1995; Wittchen, Zhao, Abelson, Abelson, & Kessler, 1996).   
Even though these studies provide psychometric evidence based on antiquated 
diagnostic criteria, a number of these studies have specifically examined the utility of the 
CIDI-1.0 for diagnosing anxiety disorders, an issue of particular relevance for the 
proposed study.  One such study (Wittchen et al, 1995) investigated the tes -r test 
reliability and clinical validity of a modified version of the CIDI-1.0 (UM-CIDI) for the 
diagnosis of GAD.  The findings reveal adequate test-retest reliability given retest 
occurred at a 19-26 month follow-up.  However, while concordance rates between he 
UM-CIDI and the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-III-R (SCID) were lower than 
expected, the disagreement between these instruments appeared to be isolated to a 
specific criterion no longer employed in currently diagnosing GAD.  Once this criterion 
was removed, concordance between the instruments substantially improved (Wittchen et 
al., 1995).   
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The CIDI-2.1 was developed in order to incorporate revisions in diagnostic 
criteria and changes recommended based on the functional characteristics of the CIDI-1.0 
(Andrews & Peters, 1998).  While no identified studies have investigated the reliability 
and validity of the CIDI-2.1 based on DSM-IV diagnostic, the goal of developing an 
improved version of the CIDI based on years of experience with the CIDI-1.0 is likely to 
yield enhanced psychometric properties incorporated into the CIDI-2.1 (Andrews & 
Peterson, 1998) 
The CIDI-2.1 and the GADQ-IV were used in conjunction to enhance the 
accuracy of GAD diagnostic assessment.  The administration of only the GAD of the 
CIDI-2.1 section was employed to circumvent the practical limitations associated with 
the administration of a lengthy structure diagnostic interview. 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) 
Past or current diagnosis of ADHD was assessed based on participant self-report 
responses to a question asking participants if they had ever been diagnosed with attention 
problems. 
MEASURES 
Subjective Units of Worry 
The percent of thought attributed to worrying was assessed by subjective self-
report on a 0 to 100% scale.  In addition, subjective worry severity was assessed by self-
report, using an 11-point Likert scale (0 = not worried at all, 5 = moderately worried, & 
10 = extremely worried). 
Affect 
Current negative affective state was measured with the negativ  scale of the 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, and Tellegen, 1988).  
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The PANAS consists of subjective self-report ratings of positive and negative affect for 
10 positive and 10 negative descriptors relating to current affect (e.g. jittery or proud).  
Negative affect scores were calculated by summing ratings for each of the 10 negative 
affect items.  The PANAS was developed in order to provide an asy to use, self-report 
measure of two affective domains, positive and negative affect.  Basic psychometric data 
for the PANAS was collected primarily from undergraduate univers ty students and adult 
university employees (Watson, Clark, and Tellegen, 1988).  The PANAS has 
demonstrated good internal consistency within an undergraduate university student 
sample, and has been found to distinguish differences in negative affect between students 
and a psychiatric inpatient sample (α = .84 - .90, Watson, Clark, and Tellegen, 1988).  
The PANAS has demonstrated convergent validity with the BDI (Beck et al., 1961) 
State-Trait Anxiety Scale-Anxiety State version (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 
1970). 
Attention 
Measures of attention were obtained through administration of a serial addition 
continuous performance task (SACPT).  The SACPT was developed and pilote  with the 
goal of utilizing an attention test that would be sensitive enough to detect variation in 
attention among a college student sample.  The SACPT serially presented 310 single digit 
numbers for 600 milliseconds each with inter-stimulus intervals of 1.85 sec. Following 
the presentation of each number, the participant was required to respond if the number 
just presented would result in an odd number when added to the previous number they 
were shown.  They were not to respond if the sum of the numbers resulted in an even 
number.  This procedure allowed for the recording of reaction time (recorded in ms.), 
variability of reaction time, errors of commission, and errors of omission.  The SACPT 
presentations were constructed and presented with Presentation® software (Version 0.76, 
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www.neurobs.com).  Reaction time and error data were recorded by the presentation 
program. 
Volitional and Non-volitional Inhibition 
Non-volitional inhibition measured with the RPP (Anderson et al., 1994; 
Anderson & Spellman, 1995) was calculated by subtracting the percent f e -recall of 
associated non-practiced words (ANPW) from the percent free-recall of non-practiced 
words (NPW).  Volitional inhibition was measured with the directed forgetting task 
(DFT). Measures of volitional inhibition were calculated by subtracting the percent free-
recall of to-be- forgotten words from the percent-free recall of to-be-rem mbered words. 
INTERCOM SYSTEM  
A Westinghouse 2-channel wireless intercom system was used to communicate 
with participants isolated in a separate lab room during the thought induction sessions.  
This enabled the experimenter to communicate with the participant, but prevented 
contamination of neutral thought induction by potential activation of social-evaluative 
concerns had the experimenter remained present during the thought induction session.
INHIBITION PARADIGMS  
Stimuli Generation 
Word stimuli for the RPP and DFT were generated through a web-based pilot 
study (see Appendix A) with three objectives: 1) Obtain a list of positive and negative 
affect words for four worry and four non-worry categories to be used in the RPP. 2) 
Obtain a list of positive and negative affect words for use in the DFT, both highly related 
and unrelated to worry, but that do not fall within the four worry and non-wrry 
categories to be used in the RPP. 3) Collect normative ratings for characteristics of each 
 60 
word including affective valence, strength of association with worry, imageability, 
category association strength, and concreteness.  
The Retrieval Practice Paradigm 
Stimulus Lists 
This study employed four modified versions of the original RPP (Anderson et al., 
1994; Anderson & Spellman, 1995) including worry categories with negative words, 
worry categories with positive words, non-worry categories with negative words, and 
non-worry categories with positive words.  Stimuli in the RPP were classified based on 
assignment of categories to undergo retrieval practice (RPC) or categories that did not 
undergo retrieval practice (NPC).  Further division of words in the RPC resulted in only 
half of the RPC words receiving retrieval practice.  This yielded three different 
classifications of words in the RPP including words from RPC that undergo retrieval 
practice (RPW), RPC words that share category association but do not undergo retrieval 
practice (ANPW), and words from the NPC that are neither associated with RPC words 
nor undergo retrieval practice (NPW). 
Each RPP included 4 experimental categories with 10 words in each (number of 
words = 40), and 2 filler categories with 6 words in each (number of words = 12).  In 
order to maintain consistency in functional word characteristics, only nouns were used 
for RPP stimuli.  Further each category word set was equated based on ratings of 
imageability and category association strength obtained through the pilot study described 
in Appendix A. 
Categories in each RPP version were randomly assigned to either RPC or NPC, 
and half of the RPC words were randomly assigned to either ANPW or NPW.  This left 
two categories and half of the RPC words unexposed to retrieval practice.  In order to 
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ensure that all categories and words receive retrieval practice, three additional versions of 
each RPP were created.  
Presentation Development 
The RPP presentations were constructed and presented with Presentation® 
software (Version 0.76, www.neurobs.com).  Presentation (Version 0.76) uses a 
derivation of C++ and Java programming language to construct presentation scenarios, 
trials and stimulus events.  The development of presentation scenarios for the RPP 
corresponded with four presentation phases: a learning phase, a retrieval practice phase, a 
delay/distraction phase, and a free-recall test phase.  All word stimuli in the RPP were 
presented in Arial 40 pt font. 
The ordering of categories for the learning phase were determined using block 
randomization procedures, resulting in 10 block presentations of the four categories.  
Word order was randomized for each category independently.  In order t con rol for 
primacy and recency effects, six category-word pairs from filler categories were included 
at the beginning and end of the learning phase.  In the learning phase presentation, each 
category word pair was presented one time for category associte learning.  The 
presentation of each category word pair was set to transition every 3 sec. 
Retrieval practice was conducted using a category stem-cue format.  Each practice 
category was presented with the two-letter stem cue for the espective retrieval practice 
word (RPW). Stimuli in the retrieval practice phase were constructed to accomplish two 
goals: to pair each of the 10 RPWs with its respective category for presentation three 
times, and to provide a conditional branching framework that ensures succes f l r trieval 
practice of all RPWs.  The ordering of category-exemplar pairs were determined by block 
randomization, resulting in a single presentation of each of 10 category- xemplar pairs 
within each of 3 blocks.  In order to control for primacy effects, recency effects, and 
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spacing between repetitions of experimental category-word pairs, c tegory-word pairs 
from filler categories were included at the beginning and end of the list, and after every 
three experimental category-exemplar pairs. 
The SACPT was presented during the delay/distraction phase.  This served, to 
provide a recall delay period with a non-verbal stimulus distraction ask that would 
prevent rehearsal.  
The free-recall phase involved the category prompted recall of awords learned 
in each category during the learning phase of the RPP.  Each of the f ur experimental and 
two filler categories were presented on screen for 30 sec., during which written free recall 
of all of the words learned in each category is recorded.  The exp rimental categories 
were randomly ordered for presentation, and a filler category was presented before and 
after the experimental categories. 
The Directed Forgetting Task 
Stimulus Lists  
The DFT was constructed to enable a within task manipulation of stimuli 
association to worry (worry vs. non worry related words).  Words used in the DFT were 
rated as highly associated with worry, but weakly or not associated wi h one of the worry 
categories used in the RPP.  Two different versions of the DFT were developed based on 
affective valence (positive or negative) of word stimuli.   
Each DFT consisted of 60 words including 48 experimental and 12 buffer words, 
divided into two word lists with 24 experimental and 6 buffer words each.  Half of the 
experimental and buffer words were randomly assigned to each list, resulting in each list 
containing 12 worry and 12 non-worry related words. 
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Presentation 
The DFT presentations were constructed and presented with Presentation® 
software (Version 0.76, www.neurobs.com).  Words in each list were randomly ordered 
for presentation, and 3 buffer words were presented at the beginning ad end of each list 
to control for primacy and recency effects.  Each word in the DFT was presented for 1 
sec., in Arial 40 pt. font, followed by a blank screen appearing for one second until the 
next word is presented.  In the beginning of the DFT, one of the lists was presented for 
learning on the basis that recall of the words on the list would be test d at the end of the 
task.  Following presentation of the first list, on screen instructions were provided to 
either forget the words just presented, because they would not actually be on the test, or 
to remember the words because they would be on the test.  Following, these instructions, 
the second list was presented, followed by similar forget or remember instructions.  In 
each DFT presentation, one list was followed by forget instructions and the other list was 
followed by remember instructions. In order to control for list effects, assignment of each 
list as to-be-forgotten or to-be-remembered was counterbalanced.  To control for order 
effects, the order of forget or remember instructions following the first list presentation or 
the second list presentation was counterbalanced.  The SACPT was administered during 
the delay/distraction phase of the DFT.  Following the SACPT administration, DFT free-
recall of all words, both remember and forget words were recorded by written response. 
Design 
This study employed a 2 (induced worry vs. neutral thought) x 2 (negativ  vs. 
positive affect words) x 2 (words semantically associated vs. unassoci ted with worry) 
mixed-subjects design strategy to investigate the differential effects of induced worry, 
semantic stimuli characteristics, and word affective valance on inhibition of words in 
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memory.  Figure 5 below provides a graphic depiction of the general d sign strategy.  
Worry condition (worry induction vs. neutral thought) and affective valence (positive vs. 
negative affect words) served as between-subjects factors.  Semantic category (worry vs. 
non-worry) served as within-subjects factors.  Two different measurs of inhibition 
(volitional vs. non-volitional), obtained with the DFT and RPP respectively, s rved as the 
DVs.   
In order to investigate the hypotheses that trait worry and thought suppression 
serve as moderators of inhibitory functioning depending on the different xperimental 
conditions outlined, they were included as predictor variables in the design.  In order to 
investigate inhibitory differences between pathological and non-pathological worry under 
the different design conditions, an additional between-subjects factor with three levels 
(high-worry with and without GAD and low worry) was incorporated into the design.  
Clinical GAD status was determined based on responses from the GADQ-IV and follow-
up diagnostic assessment with the CIDI-2.1. 
Repeated measures of non-volitional inhibition were obtained by repeated 
administrations of the RPP.  Non-volitional inhibition measured by the RPP was 
calculated based on the differential free-recall percentage between non-practice words 
associated with and unassociated with the retrieval practice categories.  Volitional 
inhibition measured with the DFT was calculated based on the differential free-recall 
percentage of to-be-remembered and to-be-forgotten words.  Calculation of inhibition 
based on differences in percent free-recall provides equivalent scaling of inhibition 
measured in the RPP and DFT. 
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Figure 5: General Design Strategy Layout Including the RPP and DFT Represented as 
Repeated Measures of Inhibition with Thought Induction and Word 
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Measures of trait worry and thought suppression were based on scoresobtained 
from the PSWQ and WBSI respectively.  Measures of attention and depressive symptoms 
served as individual difference variables that were controlled for.  Attention was 
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measured based on the number of errors of omission and variations in react on time 
obtained with the serial addition continuous performance task.  Depressive symptoms 
were measured by scores on the BDI.   
An affective state score was calculated based on rating scores provided on the 
PANAS.  SUW recorded at several intervals were used to ensure maintenance of worry 
over the duration of the experiment.  Measures of attention were obtained with the 
SACPT at baseline and during the delay phase of each RPP and the DFT administration.  
This allowed for repeated measures of change in attention over the duration of the 
experiment.   It also allowed for a comparison of differences in attention based on 
participant assignment to the worry or non-worry thought condition as worry has been 
shown to interfere with attention.  Disruption of attention provides an indirect measure of 
intrusive thoughts believed to contribute to the maintenance of worry. 
Procedure 
QUESTIONNAIRES AND ASSESSMENT 
Each questionnaire packet included the PSWQ, SWQ, GADQ-IV, WBSI, and 
BDI.  The order of questionnaires was randomly determined for each packet.  Diagnostic 
assessment of GAD was conducted with the GADQ-IV and CIDI-2.1.  Only individuals 
with a higher likelihood of meeting GAD diagnostic criteria on the GAD-IV were 
administered the CIDI-2.1.  Past or current ADHD was assessed with a single question 
assessing whether or not the participant has ever been diagnosed as having attention 
problems, past or current.  Demographic information including age, gender, and ethnicity 
was collected.  In addition, self-reported high school and current GPA, and SAT scores 
were collected as measures of academic achievement and proxy measures of intellectual 
ability.  Lastly, diagnostic history including current or past major depression, current or 
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past ADHD, and current medication use were obtained through a brief scr ening 
interview. 
WORRY AND NEUTRAL THOUGHT INDUCTION  
Participants were administered either an idiopathic worry induction or neutral 
thought induction based on their assignment to condition.  In order to avoid the potential 
confound of activating social evaluative concerns arising from the experimenters’ 
presence during the neutral thought induction, participants were left alone in a room, in a 
comfortable chair during all thought induction sessions. 
In the worry induction condition, the participant was escorted to the induct on 
room and the experimenter spent a brief period with the participant in order to identify 
their greatest area of worry.  This was assessed based on items endorsed highest on the 
SWQ-30.  The participant was asked which of the areas endorsed constituted the most 
worry for them, and whether there was another area, not addressed by the questionnaire 
that they worried about more.  Once identified, the participant was asked to sit alone in 
the induction room and worry about that topic intensely and in their usual manner until 
asked to stop.   
In the neutral thought procedure, participants were asked to choose a topicthey 
felt neutral about, which provided the focus of their thought for the neutral thought 
induction.  Examples included activities such as camping, watching television, reading, 
or eating a meal, etc.  
Induction boosters were administered prior to each subsequent RPP or the DFT.  
Participants were asked to repeat the same thought procedure they had engaged in before.
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EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL AND DATA COLLECTION  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions based on though  
induction (worry vs. neutral thought) and affective valence of the word stimuli (positive 
vs. negative) for the RPPs and DFT.  All participants were administered the DFT and 
received two administrations of the RPP; one constructed with worry categories and one 
with non-worry categories.  Both worry and non-worry words were used in the DFT, 
which provided repeated measure of volitional inhibition of both worry and non-worry 
words.  In order to control for possible carryover effects, three possible order 
combinations were used based on repeated RPP administration and the single DFT 
administration.  These orders differed based on ordinal position of the DFT, before the 
first RPP, between the first and second RPP, or after the second RPP.  Table 1 presented 
below provides a graphic depiction of each order. 
After undergoing informed consent, participants completed a questionnaire packet 
including the PSWQ, SWQ-30, GADQ-IV, WBSI, and BDI-II and underwent a brief 
screening interview to collect data on demographics, academic performance, current and 
past diagnostic history of depression and/or ADHD, and current medication information.  
Participants who met GAD criteria on the GADQ were interviewed with the GAD section 
of the CIDI-2.1 anxiety module.  The experimenter administered the CIDI-2.1 through a 
brief interview, and participant responses were manually recorded for later scoring.   
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Table 1  Table of RPP and DFT Counterbalanced Administration Orders 
 
Upon completion of the questionnaires and assessment interview, participants 
were instructed in how to wear the heart rate monitor, and recording of hear rate began.  
An event marker was entered into the heart rate monitor at the beginning and end of each 
task.  After heart rate monitoring was started, participants were taken to another room for 
isolation where they were administered instructions for either neutral or worry thought 
Order #1 
 Thought Induction 
  Worry  Neutral Thought 
  RPP Categories  RPP Categories 
1st RPP  Worry  Non-worry  Worry  Non-worry 
 Affective Valence + -  + -  + -  + - 
             
2nd RPP  Non-worry  Worry  Non-worry  Non-worry 
 Affective Valence + -  + -  + -  + - 
             
DFT Affective Valence + -  + -  + -  + - 
 
Order #2 
 Thought Induction 
  Worry  Neutral Thought 
  RPP Categories  RPP Categories 
1st RPP  Worry  Non-worry  Worry  Non-worry 
 Affective Valence + -  + -  + -  + - 
             
DFT Affective Valence + -  + -  + -  + - 
             
2nd RPP  Non-worry  Worry  Non-worry  Non-worry 
 Affective Valence + -  + -  + -  + - 
 
Order #3 
 Thought Induction 
  Worry  Neutral Thought 
DFT Affective Valence + -  + -  + -  + - 
  
RPP Categories  RPP Categories 
1st RPP  Worry  Non-worry  Worry  Non-worry 
 Affective Valence + -  + -  + -  + - 
             
2nd RPP  Non-worry  Worry  Non-worry  Non-worry 
 Affective Valence + -  + -  + -  + - 
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induction.  The experimenter obtained worry ratings from participants t he beginning 
and end of each induction session via intercom.  Upon completion of thought inductio , 
participants provided self-report ratings of subjective worry (SWU) and affect (PANAS), 
These ratings were also obtained following each subsequent booster inductio .  
Participants were then administered the first RPP, the DFT, and the second RPP.  
Instructions for participants at each stage of the RPP are provided in Appendix C1, and 
instructions for participants at each stage of the DFT are provided in Appendix C2.  
Following each task, participants received a 5 min. induction booster session.  Each 
experimental administration was estimated to take approximately 2-hrs.  Upon 
completion, participants were debriefed and thanked for their assistance.  Participants 
who demonstrated a marked increase in negative affect were contacted he next day to 
confirm the transient nature of these negative mood effects and to provide them with 
assistance where necessary.  This only occurred twice over the course of the experiment, 
and follow up assessment resulted in participants reporting they had returned to baseline 
levels of affect within 30 min. of leaving the experiment room. 
Statistical Analyses 
ANCOVA S TESTING TRAIT WORRY AND THOUGHT SUPPRESSION PREDICTORS 
The analyses for all experimental hypotheses relating to trait worry, worry 
induction, category association with worry, and affective valence of word stimuli were 
analyzed in a 2 x 2 x 2 repeated measures ANCOVA with trait worry entered as a 
continuous variable.  An a priori alpha of .05 was set.  Repeated measures of volitional 
and non-volitional inhibition were entered from scores obtained by the DFT and RPPs 
respectively.  Within-participants repeated measures of inhibition of words semantically 
associated and unassociated with worry categories were entered bas d on measures from 
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the repeated RPPs and the DFT.  Type of thought induction (worry or neut al), and 
affective word valence (positive or negative) were entered as between-participants 
factors.  Trait worry measured by the PSWQ was entered as a covariate.  Current level of 
depressive symptoms, measured with the BDI-II was entered as a covariate to control for 
the effects of depression on inhibition. 
Simple-effects comparisons were determined by results from the initial 
ANCOVA, and used to investigate hypotheses relating to specific interaction effects.   
Follow-up ANCOVAs and multiple regression analyses were conducted to investigate 
interaction effects in the model and identify simple-effects. 
This same analytic strategy was repeated for thought suppression scores obtained 
with the WBSI.  In this case, trait worry was removed as a covariate, and thought 
suppression was entered in its place.   
Due to an insufficient number of participants meeting the GAD diagnostic criteria 
(n = 0) required by the GAD-Q and the CIDI 2.1, analyses investigating differences 
between individuals meeting criteria for GAD and non-clinical controls had to be 
abandoned.   
TESTS OF MEDIATION  
In order to test the hypotheses that the relationship between trait worry or thought 
suppression and volitional inhibition would be partially mediated by non-volitional 
inhibition, tests of mediation were conducted using regression analyses.  Tests of 
mediation were conducted for the experimental conditions where a relationship between 
either trait worry or thought suppression and volitional inhibition were identified.  These 
analyses followed the guidelines proposed by the MacArthur approach (Kraemer, 
Kiernan, Essex, & Kupfer, 2008; Makinnon, 2008) for testing mediation.  The MacArthur 
approach requires two necessary, but not sufficient criteria be met for a potential 
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mediator.  First, that the predictor temporally precedes the mediator.  This must be 
empirically established.  Second, the predictor and the mediator must be ignificantly 
correlated.  Given the study design, temporal precedence of the predicto  over the 
mediator could not be established observationally.  However, the goal of these analyses 
were to test the potential of non-volitional inhibition to serve as a mediator between trait 
worry or thought suppression and volitional inhibition.  Consequently, establishing it as 
meeting other correlational criteria is an advance forward in its consideration as a 
potential mediator.   
The analytic strategy set forth in the MacArthur approach (Kraemer, Kiernan, 
Essex, & Kupfer, 2008, Makinnon, 2008) was followed with volitional inhibition serving 
as the criterion variable, either trait worry or thought suppression serving as predictors, 
and non-volitional inhibition serving as the potential mediator.  In step one, the 
correlation between predictor and outcome variable (trait worry or thought suppression 
and volitional inhibition) was calculated.  In step two, the correlation between the 
predictor and the mediator (trait worry or thought suppression and non-volitional 
inhibition) was calculated.  In the last step linear regression was conducted with trait 
worry or thought suppression entered as predictors, non-volitional inhibiton entered as 
the mediator, and volitional inhibition entered as the criterion variable.  Correlationa 
criteria for partial mediation would be confirmed if a significant amount of shared 
variance in volitional inhibition was accounted for by non-volitional inhibition in the 
model when the predictors of either trait worry or thought suppression were also included 




This section presents descriptive data for the study sample, intercorrelations of 
measures, and means and standard deviations of inhibition measures by factor.  No 
significant group differences or interaction were found for academic performance 
measures based on thought induction or stimuli affective valence.  Table 2 provides 
means and standard deviations of academic data for the sample by thought ind ction and 
stimuli affective valence conditions.  No significant group differences or interaction were 
found for individual difference measures based on thought induction or stimuli affective 
valence. Table 3 provides means and standard deviations of individual difference 
measures including measure of anxiety, worry, thought suppression and depression based 
on assignment to stimuli affective valence and thought induction conditions. 
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Table 2 Table of Means and Standard Deviations of Participants Self-reported 
Academic Performance by Thought Induction and Word Affective Valence 
Conditions 
Affective Valence 
 Thought Induction Condition 
Worry Induction  Neutral Thought 
Negative Affect Words  n M SD  n M SD 
High School GPA  22 3.90 .519  18 3.98 .518 
College GPA  18 3.48 .473  11 3.17 .585 
SAT Scores  22 1294.55 174.89  16 1321.25 112.72 
         
  Worry Induction  Neutral Thought 
Positive Affect Words  n M SD  n M SD 
High School GPA  24 3.91 .408  21 3.84 .480 
College GPA  20 3.22 .618  13 3.32 .648 
SAT Scores  24 1268.33 125.20  20 1233.50 147.23 
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Table 3 Table of Means and Standard Deviations of Individual Difference Factors 
by Thought Induction and Word Affective Valence Conditions 
Affective Valence 
 Thought Induction Condition 
 
Worry Induction 




(n = 18) 
Negative Affect Words  M SD  M SD 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait 
Version  
 
39.09 9.56  35.11 9.24 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire   44.50 11.69  46.56 11.89 
Student Worry Questionnaire-30   46.55 19.81  45.22 24.86 
White Bear Suppression Inventory   44.91 11.63  44.33 12.54 
Beck Depression Inventory-II   6.95 4.88  6.89 5.22 
       
  
Worry Induction 
(n = 25)  
Neutral Thought 
(n = 21) 
Positive Affect Words  M SD  M SD 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait 
Version  
 
38.92 8.65  37.00 6.35 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire   46.76 13.84  47.76 13.93 
Student Worry Questionnaire-30   52.84 20.66  51.57 17.51 
White Bear Suppression Inventory   46.56 11.31  48.24 8.92 
Beck Depression Inventory-II   7.68 4.63  6.38 3.25 
No significant correlations with measures of inhibition were found betwe n any 
individual difference measure, academic performance measure, or baseline assessment of 
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worry.  Table 4 provides correlations between measures of inhibition and measures of 
individual differences, academic performance, and baseline worry. 
Table 4  Table of r Values for Correlations of Individual Difference Measures, 
Academic Performance, and Baseline Assessment Measures with Inhibitio  
Measures 
 Inhibition Measures 














Inventory-Trait Version  
.136 .077 -.073 .053 
Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire  .189 .085 -.130 .151 
Student Worry 
Questionnaire-30  .159 .053 .048 .198 
White Bear Suppression 
Inventory  .031 .022 .050 .116 
Beck Depression 
Inventory-II  .160 .106 -.067 .028 
     
Academic Performance     
 
High School GPA 
(n = 85) 
.024 .135 -.045 .015 
College GPA (n = 62) -.167 .135 -.180 .202 
SAT Score (n = 82) -.008 -.094 -.089 .045 
 
    
Baseline Assessment     
 
Subjective Units of 
Worry 
.016 -.193 .049 -.008 
Percentage of Worry 
Thought Reported .044 -.167 -.027 .003 
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Worry Induction Manipulation check 
SUBJECTIVE UNITS OF WORRY AND PERCENTAGE OF WORRY THOUGHT CONTENT  
In order to provide a check for the effectiveness of the worry induction procedure, 
subjective units of worry (SUW) and subjective percent of worry thought con ent were 
assessed for pre-experimental baseline, following each of the thre induction sessions, 
and immediately upon completion of the last experimental task.  A repeat d measures 
ANOVA comparing the worry induction group with the neutral thought induction gr up 
revealed a significant interaction between thought induction condition and SUW F 
(4,336) = 21.85, p < .05.  The worry and neutral thought induction groups did not show a 
difference in SUW at baseline.  However, the worry induction group re orted 
significantly higher levels of subjective worry following each of the three thought 
induction sessions than the neutral thought control group.  These differences were 
maintained through the experimental phases with a return to baseline levels during the 
post-experimental baseline assessment. Table 5 provides means and standard deviations 
of SUW by induction condition across the assessment phases. 
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Table 5 Table of Means and Standard Deviations of Subjective Units of Worry by 
Thought Induction Group over Repeated Assessment Phases 




(n = 39)  
Neutral Thought 




M SD  M SD 
Pre-experimental Baseline 
 
25.11 21.80  23.69 22.72 
First Induction Session 
 
44.62 23.08  10.73 13.68 
Second Induction Session 
 
41.64 22.98  10.51 13.68 
Third Induction Session 
 
41.72 20.83  10.85 14.63 
Post-experimental Baseline 
 
26.94 20.55  10.42 14.57 
 
This same analytic procedure was repeated for self-reported percentage of worry 
thought content.  Results revealed a significant interaction between self-reported percent 
of worry thought content and induction condition F (4,336) = 29.43, p < .05.  The worry 
and neutral thought induction groups did not show a difference in self-reported percent of 
worry thought content at baseline.  However, the worry induction group reported a 
significantly higher percentage of worry thought content following each of the three 
thought induction sessions than the neutral thought control group, and an increase in 
worry from baseline.  These differences were maintained through the exp rimental 
phases with a return to baseline levels during the post-experimental baseline assessment.  
Table 6 provides means and standard deviations of percentages of self-reported worry 
thought content by induction condition across the assessment phases. 
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Table 6 Table of Means and Standard Deviations of Percentage of Worry Thought 
Content by Thought Induction Group over Repeated Assessment Phases 




(n = 39)  
Neutral Thought 




M SD  M SD 
Pre-experimental Baseline 
 
28.00 23.58  28.23 26.37 
First Induction Session 
 
58.21 29.73  12.90 19.94 
Second Induction Session 
 
54.47 24.24  11.59 17.40 
Third Induction Session 
 
51.40 26.22  11.14 16.98 
Post-experimental Baseline 
 
32.72 24.38  12.29 18.16 
Negative Affect 
In order to assess differential changes in affect resulting from the thought 
induction manipulation, self report ratings of negative affect were assessed using the 
PANAS-N for pre-experimental baseline, following each thought induction session, and 
for post-experimental baseline.  A repeated measures ANOVA comparing the worry 
induction group with the neutral thought induction group revealed a significant 
interaction between thought induction condition and negative affect ratings o  the 
PANAS-N F (4,336) = 21.85, p < .05.  The worry and neutral thought induction groups 
did not show a difference in negative affect at baseline.  However, the worry induction 
group reported significantly higher levels of negative affect following each of the three 
thought induction sessions than the neutral thought control group.  These differ nces 
were maintained through the experimental phases with a return to baseline levels for the 
worry induction group during the post-experimental baseline assessment.  However, the 
neutral though induction group maintained the reduction in negative affect scores through 
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the post-experimental baseline assessment.  Follow up repeated measures ANOVAs  and 
pairwise comparisons examining change in negative affect over rep ated assessments 
revealed that negative affect did not significantly increase from baseline in the worry 
induction group F (4,152) = 10.85, p > .05, but did significantly decrease from baseline 
in the neutral thought group F (4,184) = 2.18, p < .05.  Consequently, differences 
between the groups were driven by decreased negative affect in the neutral thought group 
rather than by increased negative affect in the worry induction group.  Table 7 provides 
means and standard deviations of negative affect scores on the PANAS-N by induction 
condition across the assessment phases. 
Table 7 Table of Means and Standard Deviations of Negative Affect Scores on the 
PANAS-N by Thought Induction Group over Repeated Assessment Phases 




(n = 39)  
Neutral Thought 




M SD  M SD 
Pre-experimental Baseline 
 
14.15 4.55  13.73 3.48 
First Induction Session 
 
15.68 4.36  11.63 2.19 
Second Induction Session 
 
15.17 5.03  11.57 2.02 
Third Induction Session 
 
14.96 4.72  11.50 1.76 
Post-experimental Baseline 
 
13.98 4.33  11.32 1.76 
Attention 
In order to assess differential changes in attention over the experiment as a result 
of the thought induction manipulation, a serial addition continuous performance test 
(SACPT) was administered at pre-experimental baseline and during the delay phase of 
each of the three subsequent inhibition tasks.  Comparisons between the worry thought 
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induction and neutral thought induction groups on differences in reaction time and errors 
of omission were conducted using repeated measures ANOVAs.  Reults revealed no 
significant interaction between thought induction and mean reaction time on the 
(SACPT) F (3,252) = .52, p > .05.  No significant change in reaction time was detected 
over the duration of the experiment F (4,252) = .11 p > .05. Nor was a significant 
difference between the thought induction groups on mean reaction time detecte  F (1,84) 
= .16, p > .05.  Table 8 provides means and standard deviations of mean reaction times 
for the SACPT by induction condition across the assessment phases. Similarly, no 
significant interaction between thought induction and errors of omission on the (SACPT) 
was identified F (3,252) = .18, p > .05.  No significant difference in errors of omissions 
between thought induction groups was detected F (1,84) = .08, p > .05.  However, a 
significant change in errors of omissions over the course of the experiment was revealed 
F (3,252) = 7.74, p < .05.  Errors of omission increased for both groups during each 
subsequent assessment of attention with the SACPT. Table 9 provides means and 
standard deviations of errors of omissions on the SACPT by induction condition across 
the assessment phases. 
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Table 8 Table of Means and Standard Deviations of Mean Reaction Times in 
Milliseconds for the SACPT by Thought Induction Group over Repeated 
Assessment Phases 




(n = 39)  
Neutral Thought 




M SD  M SD 
Pre-experimental Baseline 
 
545.01 71.05  559.52 75.16 
First Inhibition Task 
 
536.84 62.61  558.53 80.52 
Second Inhibition Task 
 
533.38 66.03  559.37 82.73 
Third Inhibition Task 
 
545.95 71.92  567.51 81.65 
  
Table 9 Table of Means and Standard Deviations of Errors of Omission on the 
SACPT by Thought Induction Group over Repeated Assessment Phases 




(n = 39)  
Neutral Thought 




M SD  M SD 
Pre-experimental Baseline 
 
6.75 11.47  6.90 10.08 
First Inhibition Task 
 
6.63 12.43  8.47 17.05 
Second Inhibition Task 
 
9.93 17.16  10.46 20.91 
Third Inhibition Task 
 
11.59 18.08  12.84 25.25 
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Hypothesis Testing Analyses 
REPEATED MEASURES ANALYSES OF COVARIANCE INCLUDING THOUGHT 
INDUCTION CONDITION , SEMANTIC ASSOCIATION TO WORRY-CATEGORY , AND 
WORD AFFECTIVE VALENCE  
Trait Worry as a Predictor Variable 
Repeated measures ANCOVAs were conducted independently for measures of 
volitional inhibition obtained with the Directed Forgetting Task (DFT) and measures of 
non-volitional inhibition obtained with Retrieval Practice Paradigm (RPP).   Inhibition of 
words semantically associated and unassociated with worry categories served as repeated 
measures.  Worry induction (worry vs. neutral thought), and word affective valence 
(positive vs. negative) served as between-subjects factors, and trait wo ry (PSWQ score) 
served as a continuous predictor.  Current level of depressive symptoms (BDI score) was 
entered as a covariate in all the analyses to control for the effects of depressive 
symptoms.  Table 10 provides means and standard deviations for percent volitional and 
non volitional inhibition based on worry induction condition, word affective valence 
condition, and word semantic association to worry.   
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Table 10 Table of Means and Standard Deviations of Percent Inhibition as a Function 
of Inhibition Type, Worry Induction Condition, Word Affective Valence, 
and Word Association with Worry Categories 
  Worry Induction Neutral Thought 
  Word Affect Word Affect 
  Negative Positive  Negative Positive 
Inhibition 
Measure   
Category 
Association 
n = 22 n = 25  n = 18 n = 21 









6.25 19.95 -.80 14.87  -.69 21.64 5.48 14.53 









4.17 19.20 2.67 19.65  5.56 21.58 8.73 11.93 
Volitional Inhibition   
The results revealed no significant effects or interactions for measures of 
volitional inhibition.  However, a trend toward a significant 2-way interaction between 
word affective valence, and trait worry F (1,77) = 3.66, p = .059, and a trend toward a 
significant 3-way interaction between word affective valence, semantic association of 
stimuli with worry, and trait worry F (1,77) = 3.69, p = .058 were found.  
To investigate the trend toward a 2-way interaction between word affective 
valence and trait worry for volitional inhibition, follow-up multiple regrssion analyses 
were conducted.  The relationship between trait worry and volitional inhibition was 
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analyzed for negative and positive affect words independently.  Mean p rcent volitional 
inhibition, which served as the criterion variable, was calculated by computing the mean 
of percent volitional inhibition across repeated measures of words semantically 
associated and unassociated with worry.  Current level of depressive symptoms was 
controlled for in the analyses by entering BDI scores in Block 1.  Trait worry measured 
by scores on the PSWQ was entered into Block 2 for each analysis s the predictor 
variable of interest.   The results revealed that after controlli g for current level of 
depressive symptoms, trait worry accounted for a significant increase in variance for the 
mean volitional inhibition of positive (R2change = .23; Fchange [1, 43] = 12.49, p < .05) and 
negative words (R2change = .09; Fchange [1, 37] = 4.39, p < .05).  Trait worry differentially 
predicted mean volitional inhibition based on the negative or positive affective valence of 
words.  Higher levels of trait worry were associated with higher levels of mean volitional 
inhibition of positive words (β = .52), but lower levels of mean volitional inhibition of 
negative words (β = -.34). 
Follow up MANCOVAs were conducted to investigate the trend toward a 3-way 
interaction between word affective valence, semantic association of stimuli with worry, 
and trait worry for volitional inhibition.  A MANCOVA was conducted to investigate the 
interaction between word affective valence and trait worry for measures of volitional 
inhibition of words semantically associated and unassociated with worry.  Results 
revealed a significant interaction between word affective valence and trait worry for the 
volitional inhibition of words semantically associated with worry F (1,85) = 8.88, p < .05, 
but not for words semantically unassociated with worry F (1,85) = .0000005, p > .05.  
ANCOVAs to investigate the interaction between semantic association of words to worry 
and trait worry were conducted for groups receiving negative or positive affect words 
independently.  Results revealed a significant interaction between semantic association to 
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worry and trait worry for the volitional inhibition of positive words F (1,43) = 4.10, p < 
.05, but not negative words F (1,37) = 1.29, p > .05. 
In order to further investigate the relationship between trait worry and volitional 
inhibition of words based on their affective valence and semantic associ tion with worry, 
multiple linear regression analyses were conducted for dependent measures of volitional 
inhibition including inhibition of negative and positive affect words semantically 
associated and unassociated with worry categories.  Current level of depressive 
symptoms was controlled for in the analyses by entering BDI score  in Block 1.  Trait 
worry measured by scores on the PSWQ was entered into Block 2 for each analysis as the 
predictor variable of interest.   The results revealed that after controlling for current level 
of depressive symptoms, trait worry did not account for a significa t increase in variance 
for the volitional inhibition of either negative words (R2change = .003; F change [1, 37] = 
.10, p > .05) or positive words (R2change = .027; Fchange [1, 43] = 1.22, p > .05) when those 
words were not semantically associated with worry categories.  In contrast, when words 
were semantically associated with categories of worry, trait worry did account for a 
significant increase in variance for the volitional inhibition of positive words (R2change = 
.23; Fchange [1, 43] = 12.90, p < .05), and negative words (R
2
change = .12;  change [1, 37] F = 
5.40, p < .05).  For negative words semantically associated with worry categories, higher 
levels of trait worry were predictive of lower levels of volitional inhibition of these words 
(β = -.39, see Figure 6).  In contrast, higher levels of trait worry were predictive of higher 
levels of volitional inhibition for positive words (β = .53, see Figure 7) that were 
semantically associated with worry categories. 
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Figure 6:   Regression Line of PSWQ Scores as a Predictor of Percent Inhibition on the 
DFT for Negative Affect Words Semantically Associated with Categoris of 
Worry 
PSWQ Scores as a Predictor of Volitional Inhibition of Negative Affect 





























ß  = -.39
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Figure 7:   Regression Line of PSWQ Scores as a Predictor of Percent Inhibition on the 
DFT for Positive Affect Words Semantically Associated with Categoris of 
Worry 
PSWQ Scores as a Predictor of Volitional Inhibition of Positive Affect 





























ß  = .53
 
Non-volitional Inhibition 
Result revealed no significant effects or interactions for non-volitional inhibition 
based on thought induction, word affective valence, semantic association of words to 
worry, or trait worry. 
Thought Suppression as a Predictor Variable 
Repeated measures ANCOVAs including word stimuli association to worry 
categories (associated vs. not associated), worry induction (worry vs. neutral thought), 
and word affective valence (positive vs. negative) were conducted with thought 
 89 
suppression (WBSI score) serving as a predictor for volitional and non-volitional 
inhibition independently.  Current level of depressive symptoms (BDI score) was entered 
as a covariate to control for the effects of depressive symptoms. 
Result revealed no significant effects or interactions for either volitional or non-
volitional inhibition based on thought induction, word affective valence, semantic 
association of words to worry, or thought suppression. 
TESTS OF MEDIATION  
Analyses of Non-Volitional Inhibition as a Mediator for the Relationship between 
Volitional Inhibition and Trait Worry of Positive and Negative Words Semantically 
Associated with Worry Categories 
Following the guidelines for tests of mediation set forth by the MacArthur 
approach (Kraemer, Kiernan, Essex, & Kupfer, 2008, Makinnon, 2008), testing the 
potential for non-volitional inhibition to serve as a mediator of trait worry on volitional 
inhibition the, a correlation between volitional inhibition and trait worry must first be 
established.  As reported earlier, trait worry accounts for a significant amount of variance 
in volitional inhibition of both positive (R2change = .23) and negative words (R
2
change = .12) 
that are semantically associated with categories of worry when controlling for BDI 
scores.  However, trait worry only accounts for a significant amount of the variance in 
volitional inhibition of positive words associated with worry when BDI scores are not 
entered (R2 = .20; [1, 45] F = 11.26, p < .05).  In the second step, the correlation between 
trait worry and non-volitional inhibition of positive words associated with categories of 
worry was investigated using Pearson’s correlations.  A trend toward a significant 
correlation between trait worry and non volitional inhibition was identifi d or positive 
words associated with worry categories (r = -.273, p =.67).  Due to this trend, a 
regression analysis was conducted with both trait worry and non-volitional nhibition of 
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positive words associated with worry entered.  The interaction between centered 
measures of trait worry and non-volitional inhibition was also entered into the model, and 
volitional inhibition of positive words associated with worry served as the criterion.  
Results revealed that non-volitional inhibition approached significance s a predictor of 
volitional inhibition (t = 1.75, p < .092) when trait worry was entered in the model.  The 
interaction between trait worry and non-volitional inhibition was not a significant 
predictor of volitional inhibition when entered with trait worry (t = .04, p > .05)  
As no relationship between measures of volitional inhibition and thought 
suppression were identified in the previous analyses, no tests of mediation were 
conducted for thought suppression. 
DISCUSSION 
Inhibition 
Volitional and non-volitional inhibition both served as dependent measures in thi
study and were predicted to mirror one another with respect to the affect factors in this 
study would have on them.  Even further, it was hypothesized that non volitional 
inhibition would serve to mediate the relationship between volitional inhibition and other 
factors such as trait worry and thought suppression.  Unfortunately, no firm conclusions 
may be drawn from the results of the mediation analysis testing no -volitional inhibition 
as a mediator of trait worry on volitional inhibition.  In the strict sense trait worry was not 
significantly correlated with the non-volitional inhibition of positive words associated 
with worry.  Consequently, non-volitional inhibition failed to meet one of the criteria for 
mediation set forth in the MacArthur approach (Kraemer, Kiernan, Essex, & Kupfer, 
2008, Makinnon, 2008), that the mediator be significantly correlated with the predictor.  
However, because the correlation between trait worry and non-volitional nhibition 
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approached significance, an exploratory test of mediation was conduted.  It this case, 
non-volitional inhibition failed to reach, but approached significance as a potential 
mediator of trait worry on volitional inhibition.  These results are equivocal, and indicate 
the possibility that non-volitional inhibition mediates the relationship between trait worry 
and volitional inhibition of positive words associated with worry.   
Also contrary to predictions, non-volitional inhibition was not significantly 
affected by any of the experimental factors in this study, and was not significantly 
associated with the predictor variables investigated.    
The findings from this study demonstrate a lack of consistent association between 
volitional and non volitional forms of inhibition, and an absence of study effects for non-
volitional inhibition that were present for volitional inhibition.  This calls into question 
the proposition that these differently conceptualized forms of inhibition function the sam  
way in response to external influences or in association with individual difference factors.  
Whereas factors such as trait worry, semantic association of stimuli to worry, and 
affective valence of words may influence an individual’s ability to volitionally forget 
information, non-volitional inhibition may be governed by other, more automatic 
processes less amenable to these influences. 
Worry versus Neutral Thought Induction 
In designing this study, the differential induction of worry in some participants 
and neutral thought in others was expected to exert the greatest influence on inhibition in 
memory.  The effects that word affective valence and semantic ssociation of words to 
worry had on inhibition were expected to be the most identifiable and strongest when 
worry was induced.  In a previous study (Brown, Tucker, & Telch, unpublished 
manuscript) trait worry was found to differentially predict change in inhibition of neutral 
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words unassociated with worry following exposure to potential threat. Exposure to 
potential threat was believed to have activated worry for individuals, thus differentially 
affecting how individuals inhibit information in memory based on their tra t tendency to 
worry.  As such, the direct induction of worry was predicted to exert the greatest 
influence on the relationship between trait worry or thought induction and inhibition.  
Contrary to these predictions, differential thought induction did not significantly affect 
inhibition based on these factors.  It did not significantly affect the association between 
trait worry or thought suppression and inhibition.  Nor did it significantly interact with 
any other factors to affect the association between trait worry or thought suppression and 
inhibition. 
Worry induction manipulation checks confirmed the successful induction of 
worry relative to the neutral thought based on self reported worry and percentage of 
thought content related to worry.  However, the worry induction failed to result in any 
significant effect of induced worry on inhibition.  The lack of effect of type of induced 
thought on inhibition or the association between trait worry or thought suppression and 
inhibition warrants exploration.  The failure of induced worry to differentially affect the 
association between trait worry or thought suppression and inhibition, particularly non-
volitional inhibition seems to contradict earlier findings that trait worry is associated with 
increased inhibition of neutral words, semantically unassociated with worry, following 
threat induction (Brown, Tucker, & Telch., unpublished manuscript).  One major 
difference between these studies is that the effect of worry induction in this study was 
investigated as a between-subjects factor, whereas the effect o  threat induction on 
inhibition in the Brown, Tucker, and Telch study (unpublished manuscript) was assessed 
by pre and post threat induction measures of inhibition.  Assessing the effect of a 
manipulated variable by use of repeated measures is a much more powerful design 
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strategy and may account for the difference in findings between these studies.  Another 
difference is that worry was induced in this study directly viathought induction 
procedures, whereas worry was not directly induced in the Brown, Tucker, and Telch 
study.  This may mean that differences in inhibition associated with trait worry occur 
through activation of fear, rather than worry. 
Word Affective Valence 
Consistent with predictions, word affective valence was a significa t factor in the 
association between volitional inhibition and trait worry.  Individuals with a higher 
tendency toward worry show less volitional inhibition of negative words in memory and 
more volitional inhibition of positive words.  This finding is consistent wi h prior 
research showing that worry is associated with, and increases negative affect (Borkovec 
at al. 1983; Beck, Perkins, Holder, Robbins, Gray, & Allison, 2001; York, Borkovec, 
Vasey, & Stern, 1987; Andrews & Borkovec, 1988; Borkovec & Inz, 1990).  It raises the 
possibility that volitional inhibition may serve to mediate the relationship between worry 
and negative affect.  A post-hoc test of mediation with volitional inhib tion of negative 
words associated with worry as the hypothesized mediator for trait worry predicting 
baseline levels of negative affect revealed that both trait worry (t = 4.59, p <.01) and 
volitional inhibition (t = 2.39, p <.05) were significant predictors in the model.  While the 
required temporal precedence for mediation could not be established here, these findings 
are consistent with what would be expected should volitional inhibition serve to mediate 
the relationship between trait worry and negative affect.  
In addition to the potential mediator role, volitional inhibition of information in 
memory may serve to maintain worry through increased activation of negative 
information in individuals with a greater tendency to worry.  The more readily accessible 
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negative thoughts are, the more likely they would be to prompt worry.  Finding less 
inhibition of negative words associated with trait worry may also have implications with 
respect to negative rumination associated with depression.  An individual’s ability to 
volitionally inhibit the activation of negative information may play an important role in 
how well they can control negative thoughts characteristic of depression.  Results from a 
regression analysis employing the same method as that exploring negative affect were 
replicated with BDI scores entered as the criterion variable with trait worry (t = 4.07, p 
<.01) and volitional inhibition of negative worry words (t = 2.79, p <.01) both 
significantly predicting BDI scores. 
Semantic Association of Words to Categories of Worry 
One of the most interesting findings from this study is that voliional inhibition in 
individuals high in trait worry is not only influenced by the affective valence of 
information, but also by the semantic association of information to common domains of 
worry.  In fact, the findings indicate that the semantic associati n of words to worry plays 
a super ordinate role to affective valence in influencing the relationship between trait 
worry and volitional inhibition.  In line with predictions, a higher tendency toward worry 
is significantly associated with less inhibition of negative words and more inhibition of 
positive words when those words are semantically associated with worry.  However, 
when those words are semantically unassociated with worry, trait worry is not 
significantly associated with the volitional inhibition of either negative or positive words.  
What is most notable about these findings is that negative and positive affective material, 
both semantically associated with worry, are treated differently i  memory based on an 
individual’s tendency to worry.  This is consistent with previous findings for the 
proposition that worry related information in memory is semantically organized (Craske, 
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et al., 1989; Sanderson & Barlow, 1990: Tallis, et al., 1992; Roemer, et al., 1997; 
Eysenck, 1984; Pratt, Tallis, & Eysenck, 1997; Provencher, Freeston, Dugas, Ladouceur, 
2000).  It also provides evidence consistent with Barlow’s (1987) proposal that dual 
activation processes may be at work simultaneously within semantic nodes associated 
with mood or anxiety, or in this case, worry.  Negative information, receiving less 
inhibition within a worry node would have a higher activation level, and positive 
information, receiving more inhibition within the same node would have lowr levels of 
activation.  Consequently, for individuals with a greater tendency to worry, negative 
information associated with their worry would have a higher activation level than positive 
information.  This means that negative information associated with their worry would be 
more easily retrievable from memory during active periods of worry.  Not only would 
this likely result in a greater tendency to experience negative ffect, but it would also 
make it more difficult for an individual to access positive propositions about their worry 
helpful in countering the potential negative consequences they are worrying about.   
In addition, this pattern of memory-based activation may serve as a potential 
mechanism for the maintenance of worry.  Negative propositions associted with worry 
would pose a higher threat potential than positive propositions.  If the activation of 
negative information in memory is boosted, while the activation of positive information 
is suppressed, the most easily retrievable information would be information wih a greater 
threat potential, consequently prompting more worry.  In support of this, Pilippe, 
Lecours, and Beaulieu-Pellieter (2009) have proposed an Emotion Memories Network 
theory in which their research shows that accessibility of semantically related positive 
information in memory serves as a resilience factor protecting against emotional 
disruption.  Consequently, individuals who show a greater tendency toward increased 
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inhibition of positive information and decreased inhibition of negative information would 
be at increased risk for emotional problems. 
Clinical Implications 
Findings from this study offer a number of important implications for further 
understanding GAD, the development of potential strategies related to he assessment and 
treatment of GAD, and the potential role of memory-based inhibition n other anxiety 
disorders such as PTSD or OCD.   
In sum, the findings show that individuals with higher levels of trait worry tend to 
have a higher activation level for negative information in memory associated with worry, 
and lower activation level for positive information associated with orry.   This provides 
a mechanism in memory through which pathological worry may be resistant to corrective 
information and self-perpetuating.  In order for corrective information  provide 
treatment benefit for someone with GAD, they would need to be able to generate 
outcome alternatives to the negative outcomes they are focused on.  Given the findings of 
this study, that may be a difficult proposition for someone with a strong tendency to 
worry.  If positive information semantically associated with their worry is being actively 
suppressed in memory, retrieving this information to employ in reevaluating their worry 
would be more difficult.  On the upside, the activation of this information is being 
volitionally suppressed.  This implies the possibility that someone may be trained to 
exercise their intent to modify how active, and consequently accessible, corrective 
information related to their worry is.  The recent success of attention training techniques 
in reducing naturalistic anxiety (See, MacLeod, & Bridle, 2009), and nxiety in GAD 
(Hazen, Vasey, Schmidt, 2009; Amir, Beard, Burns, & Bomyea, 2009) and social phobia 
(McEvoy & Perini, 2009) based on the work of Macleod and colleagues (2002), is potent 
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evidence for this possibility, and highlights the importance of identifyi g putative 
cognitive factors maintaining pathological levels of anxiety.  The efficacy of attention 
retraining in reducing anxiety highlights its potential as a cognitive treatment component 
that may further enhance treatment efficacy.  The identification of attention biases 
associated with anxiety has led to the development and investigation of attention training 
techniques as a strategy to reduce attention biases and consequent anxi ty.  Similarly, 
identification of memory processes as potential maintaining factors in anxiety, may lead 
to the development and implementation of memory retraining techniques with the 
potential of serving as an additional cognitive treatment component with the goal of 
enhancing treatment efficacy. 
A primary diagnostic criterion for the diagnosis of GAD is uncontrollable worry.  
Given the properties of semantic networks in memory (Loftus, 1974; Anderson, 1976), 
the increased activation of negative information associated with worry, and concurrent 
suppression of positive information, would lead to a lower threshold for the activation of 
negative worry related information.  Simply put, the more you worry, the less stimulation 
you need to activate your worry.  This has important implications f r treatments that 
employ worry exposure as it creates the potential to result in an adverse paradoxical 
effect on worry reduction. 
Lastly, these findings may have important implications for understanding how 
factors in memory, such as inhibition, may play a role in the pathology of other anxiety 
disorders such as PTSD or OCD.  Both PTSD and OCD involve intrusive cognitions in 
their pathology.  The identification of memory based inhibitory processes associated with 
cognitive intrusions in these disorders would increase understanding of these disorders 
and may highlight memory as playing a particularly important role in them.  In turn, 
considering how information might be differently processed in individuals dealing with 
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PTSD and OCD may provide ideas for additional cognitive treatment components that 
enhance treatment efficacy. 
Limitations 
The foremost limitation of this study was its scope and scale.  This may have 
resulted in a number of adverse effects.  For instance, the design r quired participants to 
engage in memory tasks and assessment tasks for approximately two uninterrupted hours.  
The quality of data collected from participants and potency of the worry inductions may 
have decreased over the duration of experimental administration despite self-reported 
assessment of worry by participants.  Simple fatigue effects are known to affect the 
quality of data collection.  Another potential mechanism would be loss of attentional 
focus over the experimental administration.  The number of omission err rs made by 
participants on the attention task utilized in this study significantly increased over the 
duration of the experiment across both the worry and neutral thought inducion groups.  
These data support the contention participants’ attention decreased over time.  This may 
have adversely affected the quality of the data for the memory inhibition tasks.  While 
counterbalancing controlled for the differential impact of such affects on task order or 
condition, there would still be a trend toward data collection with increased error during 
the later experimental stages.  Consequently, all of the measures may have accumulated 
increased error variance, which may not have occurred with a more succinct study focus. 
In addition to the effect of fatigue or loss of attention on measurement, they may 
have also negatively impacted the potency of the thought induction manipulation.  It’s not 
much of a stretch to posit that someone with decreased attention may be less able to 
follow instructions for a manipulation that asks them to control what they are thinking 
about.  That is exactly what the worry induction attempts to do.  Participants are asked to 
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worry about a topic they would normally worry about for 5 min.  The worry induction 
was conducted three times over the duration of the experiment, prior to each memory 
task, in order to maximize the effects induced worry would have on inhibition just prior 
to assessing it.  Consequently, fatigue or loss of attention, negatively affecting the 
potency of the worry manipulation, would potentially result in a more muted effect of 
worry on inhibition assessed in the later stages of the experiment.  This possibility was 
assessed based on subjective units of worry (SUW) and self-reported percentage of 
thought content associated with worry, assessed following the initialworry induction and 
subsequent booster sessions.  Participants in the worry induction group did not show a 
significant decline in how much worry they reported over the worry induction and 
booster sessions F (2,92) = 1.02, p > .10.  However, they showed a decline that 
approached significance in the percentage of worry thought they reported engaging in 
during each subsequent booster following the initial worry induction F (2,92) = 2.71, p = 
.072.  This later finding provides support for the proposition that participants' bility to 
successfully engage in worry decreased over the duration of the experiment as they 
reported a lower percentage of worry content over repeated assessments. 
Another potential limitation of this study relates to manipulation potency.  In 
contrast to earlier findings of changes in inhibition based on differential threat induction, 
differential induction of worry did not result in a consistently identifiable effect on 
inhibition.  While a manipulation check of the worry induction based on self-report worry 
indicates the induction was successful, the absence in increased negative affect from 
baseline in the worry group raises doubts.  Worry has been demonstrated to increase 
negative affect in previous research (Borkovec at al. 1983; York, Borkovec, Vasey, & 
Stern, 1987; Andrews & Borkovec, 1988; Borkovec & Inz, 1990; Beck, Perkins, Holder, 
Robbins, Gray, & Allison, 2001; Fresco, Frankel, Mennin, Turk, & Heimburg, 2002; 
 100 
McLaughlin, Borkovec, & Sibrava, 2007).  Consequently, the successful and sufficient 
induction of worry in this study should have resulted in increased negativ  affect from 
baseline for participants who underwent worry induction, but it did not.   
It may simply be the case that induced worry does not affect inhibition in 
memory.  However, other potential reasons should be considered.  The succ ssful 
induction of worry in a laboratory that realistically approximates naturally occurring 
worry may meet with challenges.  The induction of worry in this study was performed by 
asking participants to engage in idiopathically identified worry.  Unlike fear, which may 
be activated by the presentation of stimuli perceived as threatening, the successful 
induction of worry requires an individual to willfully engage in an aversiv  mental 
activity.   Simple variability with respect to compliance will affect worry induction.  In 
addition, individuals may simply vary in their ability to volitionally engage in worry that 
reasonably simulates naturally occurring worry.  One factor that may influence this may 
simply be the ability of an individual to control their thought content.  When someone 
engages in naturally occurring worry, purportedly the focus of that worry results because 
it is evaluated as important enough to demand attention at that time.   This may result in 
the activation of a number of factors associated with naturally occurring worry that don’t 
occur during a laboratory induction of worry. 
Future Directions 
These findings partially replicate previous research identifyig an association 
between trait worry and inhibition (Brown, et al, unpublished manuscript).  
Consequently, suggested future directions for research in this area are proposed for 
investigating memory in anxiety, and for further investigating he role of memory based 
inhibition in the etiology and pathology of anxiety disorders.   
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Previous research has been inconsistent in demonstrating a memory bias related to 
anxiety (Bower, 1987; Mogg, Mathews, & Weineman, 1987; 1989; Mathews, 1990; 
Mathews & Macleod, 1994, Mathews & Milroy, 1994a).  One potential reason for this 
may be that measures of memory, such as recall, employed in common methodologies 
may not be sensitive enough to detect the influence of anxiety on memory.  
Methodologies employing memory paradigms capable of yielding measures of 
activational processes in memory may prove better able to detect differences based on 
anxiety.  To this end, the development of additional memory paradigms, tapping into 
various activational processes in memory, may serve to further advance research into the 
role of memory in anxiety. 
Another application for future research in this area relates to the clinical 
implications and applications of these findings.  Extension of this research to other areas 
of anxiety may yield potent confirmatory or contradictory evidence about the role of 
memory based inhibition in anxiety associated with both trait chara teristics and disorder.  
One particularly promising research candidate in this regard would be an investigation of 
the role of memory based inhibition in PTSD.  As common phenomena associated w th 
PTSD may include continued reexperiencing of a trauma, or sensitization to respond 
fearfully to environmental cues one associates with the trauma, memory based inhibition 
may play an important role.  Such investigations may address questions about individual 
differences in inhibiting information in memory as it relates to increased or decreased 
risk for PTSD onset following trauma exposure.  In addition such resea ch could evaluate 
whether dysinhibition or hyperinhibition predict symptom expression in PTSD.  For 
example, is dysinhibition associated with primary symptom profile involving 
reexperiencing phenomena, and is hyperinhibition associated with a prim ry symptom 
profile of numbing? 
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Specific study designs offered for future research investigatin  he role of 
memory-based inhibition include replicating these findings by examining differences in 
volitional inhibition between participants meeting criteria for GAD and non-clinical 
controls, and a prospective PTSD study design investigating the potential of volitional 
inhibition to serve as a risk factor for the development of PTSD following trauma 
exposure.  Comparing participants with GAD and non-clinical controls on change in 
inhibition pre-post worry induction based on the affective valence of words and their 
semantic association to worry would allow for further support or dismissal of the 
proposition that inhibition as a mechanism involved in pathological worry.  In order to 
assess whether inhibitory functioning may serve as a risk factor in the development of 
PTSD, a prospective design strategy is proposed in which the inhibitory functioning of 
high risk first responders (i.e. police, EMT, fire department responders) is assessed upon 
completion of training, prior to employment in the field.  Following trauma exposure, 




Generation of Word Stimuli – Proposed Pilot Study 
Generation of Word Stimuli – Word stimuli for the RPP and DFT was generated 
through a web-based study with three objectives: 1) Obtain a list of positive and negative 
affect words for four worry and four non-worry categories to be used in the RPP. 2) 
Obtain a list of positive and negative affect words for use in the DFT, both highly related 
and unrelated to worry, but that do not fall within the four categories to be used in the 
RPP.  3) Collect normative ratings for characteristics of each word including affective 
valence (positive vs. negative), association with worry, and association to category. 
A list of nouns of approximately 1,300 were generated from existing studie  using 
words with a positive or negative affective valence, studies using words associated with 
worry or anxiety, and words selected from the Webster’s collegiate dictionary (11th 
edition) based on the potential potentially for the word to meet the aforementioned 
criteria.  The selections of nouns enabled the generation for a set of timuli that do not 
differ based on their part of speech.  The generation of words within worry categories 
were chosen based on the most commonly reported spheres of worry including 
relationships, health, finances, and academics/work (Craske, Rapee, Jck l, & Barlow, 
1989; Sanderson & Barlow, 1990; Tallis, Eysenck, & Mathews, 1992; Roemer, Molina, 
& Borkovec, 1997; Osman, Gutierrez, Downs, Koppler, Barrios, Haraburda, 2001).  
Following initial word generation, agreement between three independent rat rs resulted 
in the selection of the most likely words for to be rated in the web-study. 
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Normative data collected for the words from the web study was used to create a 
stimuli set for use in the RPP and DFT that controlled for differences in association 
strength and strength of affect.  It further allowed for words to be assigned for use based 
on the manipulation of their categorical association to worry and affective valence.
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APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRES  
Note:  Copyrighted questionnaires are not included in this appendix. 
Appendix B1: Penn State Worry Questionnaire 
PSWQ 
 
Enter the number that best describes how typical or characteristi each item is of you, 
putting the number next to the item. 
 
1   2  3   4              5 
     Not at all               Somewhat                    Very 
       typical            typical                 typical 
  
___      1.   If I don't have enough time to do everything I don't worry about it. 
___ 2.   My worries overwhelm me. 
___ 3.   I don't tend to worry about things. 
___ 4.   Many situations make me worry. 
___ 5.   I know I shouldn't worry about things, but I just can't help it. 
___ 6.  When I am under pressure I worry a lot. 
___ 7.   I am always worrying about something. 
___ 8.   I find it easy to dismiss worrisome thoughts. 
___ 9.   As soon as I finish one task, I start to worry about everything  
      else I have to do. 
___ 10. I never worry about anything. 
___ 11. When there is nothing more I can do about a concern, I don't 
      worry about it any more. 
___ 12.  I've been a worrier all my life. 
___ 13.  I notice that I have been worrying about things. 
___ 14. Once I start worrying, I can't stop. 
___ 15.  I worry all the time. 
___ 16.  I worry about projects until they are all done. 
 
(Reverse-score items 1, 3, 8, 10, and 11, and then sum over 16 items.) 
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Appendix B3: White Bear Suppression Inventory 
 
WBSI 
This survey is about thoughts. There are no right or wrong answers, so plea e 
respond honestly to each of the items below. Be sure to answer every it m by circling the 
appropriate letter beside each.    
 
A B C D E 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral or Don't Know  Agree Strongly Agree 
A B C D E     1. There are things I prefer not to think about.  
A B C D E     2. Sometimes I wonder why I have the thoughts I do.  
A B C D E     3. I have thoughts that I cannot stop.  
A B C D E     4. There are images that come to mind that I cannot erase.  
A B C D E     5. My thoughts frequently return to one idea.  
A B C D E     6. I wish I could stop thinking of certain things.  
A B C D E     7. Sometimes my mind races so fast I wish I could stop it.  
A B C D E     8. I always try to put problems out of mind.  
A B C D E     9. There are thoughts that keep jumping into my head.  
A B C D E     10. There are things that I try not to think about.  
A B C D E     11. Sometimes I really wish I could stop thinking.  
A B C D E     12. I often do things to distract myself from my thoughts.  
A B C D E     13. I have thoughts that I try to avoid.  
A B C D E     14. There are many thoughts that I have that I don't tell anyone.  
 
A B C D E   15. Sometimes I stay busy just to keep thoughts from intruding on 
   my mind. 
SCORING:  Total the items with A=1, B=2, C=3, D=4, E=5.  See Wegner & 
Zanakos (1994) for norms and interpretation. 
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Appendix B4: Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire-IV 
 
 109 
APPENDIX C:  PARTICIPANT INSTRUCTIONS 
Appendix C1: RPP Instructions 
Learning Phase 
You will be presented a list of word pairs including a category and a word from 
that category.  Each word pair will appear on the monitor by itself followed shortly by the 
next pair on the list.  We would like you to try to learn all the words that are presented for 
each category. 
Retrieval Practice Phase 
Now you are going to see categories that you saw just a moment ago. The 
categories will be followed by two letters that provide a cue for one of the words you just 
learned in that category.  When presented each category and cue, type in the complete 
word that is prompted by the cue provided. Make sure to pay careful attntion to spelling 
and typos.  If you make an error, hit the backspace key to make corr cti ns.  If the 
response you enter is correct, the next category and cue will be pres nted.  If your 
response is incorrect, the same category will be presented again with another letter added 
to the cue for the correct word to aid you in identifying it.  Once you receive the cue with 
the added letter, try to type in the correct word.  If your respon e is again incorrect, this 
process will repeat. 
Delay/Distraction Phase (Serial addition continuous performance task) 
You will be presented with a series of single digits appearing one at a time.  Try 
to remember the digit series in the order they are presented.  After each digit series, there 
will be a short delay followed by a prompt to right down the digit serie  you were just 
presented.  When you are given this prompt, write down the digit series acro s the line 
provided for it in the response book before you. 
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Free-recall Test Phase 
You will be presented all of the categories, one at a time, from the list you learned 
at the beginning of this task.  When you are presented with each category, write down as 
many words as you can from the list of words you just learned for that category. 
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Appendix C2: DFT Instructions 
Before the DFT 
You will be presented with a list of words appearing one at a time on the monitor 
before you.  Try to learn as many of the words as you can, because at the end of the list 
we are going to test how many of the words you remember. 
End of First List 
Now we would like you to forget all of the words you just learned because they 
were just for practice and won’t be part of the test.  You’re going to get a new list of 
words now.  Try to learn as many of the new words as you can because the new words 
will be on your recall of the new words. 
Free-recall Test 
Please write down all of the words from the list you just saw.  We would like you 
to write down both the words from the beginning of the list that you were asked to forget, 
and the words from the end of the list you were asked to remember.  Just try to write 
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